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Abstract 
Many developing countries have or are in the process of implementing decentralisation of 
tinancial management systems. The refonn can take various fonns: self-finalll:ing or cost 
recovery through user charges and co-tinancing or expansion of local rev~nll~ through 
taxation. This study examines the impact of decentralisation of tiscal'linancial 
management of cost sharing revenue on hospital efficiency. 
Potentially. decentralisation of financial management of cost sharing is ~xpected to 
improv~ coverage and accessibility of, health services. quality of services and dJiCiency 
in th~ ddivery of health care. 
The main aim of this study was to review the impact oftiscal decentralisation or the cost 
sharing rdorm on the efficiency of Kenya's health care delivery and to iJ~nlify tactors 
that n~~d to b~ addressed in order to enhance the success of the reform polic~. 
Th~ srudy utilised secondary and primary data from 39 public health facilities comprising 
of :2 7 district hospitals and 12 sub-district hospitals. The sample size for the primary data 
ctllkclit1I1 \\as ]78 patients and 57 health workers from 4 purposively.s~b:kd facilities. 
St:cllndar~ data (inpatient and outpatient annual utilisation rates. recurrent eXI'k'llditure. 
Illll11bt:r l)f b~ds in each facility and cost sharing revenue) was used in the inpul-output 
Data Em ~lopm~nr Analysis (DEA) Model to generate efficiency levels t()r c.lcll facility. 
Tilt: pril11:lry data \\'as used to examine ho\\' fiscal decentralisation may ha\'L' impacted on 
st:I'\"ict: utilis:.nilln. and perceived quality of care. 
Tile DE.-\ dticiency scores were used to run a censored Tobit regression 111, lllc!. where 
tht: d~pelldt:nr \'ariable was technical efficiency scores. The independcnt \'ariables 
includt:d ~I tiscal decentralisation dummy variable. medical staff. non-ll1~dical sl.lff. bed 
occupancy rat~ (BOR). average length of stay (ALOS) and number of beds (used as a 
prl.l\~ for hospital capacity). 
IX 
Major findings from the study reveal that: 
• Utilisation of health care services, perceived quality of services. access and revenue 
collection (cost recovery ratio) have not improved. The failure is largely attrihuted to 
the structure of the financial management system which does not provide incentives 
to the health managers or authority and .au~onomy over the revenue expenditure, 
inefticient district treasury. and unavailability of certain health cure inputs 
(panicularly drugs). 
• Efficiency in health care facilities was lower in the post-reform period compared to 
the pre-reform period. The average efficiency level for 1994, 1995 \-vas 62.5% and 
63% respectively whilst that of 1997 and 1998 was 59% and 55% respectively, 
implying that these facilities are using more resources or inputs and coulJ lower their 
costs and still achieve the current levels of output. Facilities could therdi)J"l~ make 
sayings if the available resources are utilised efficiently. 
• Signiticant gains from the reform policy could be realised by granting more 
expenditure responsibilities and autonomy in financial management to health care 
managers as well as addressing other factors that negatively impact on efficiency. 
• Fiseal decentralisation of cost sharing revenue by itself cannot increasl' ~.'nil'iency. 
For it to achieve the stated objectives it needs to be supported by other initiati \'l'S. 
• The study recommends the need to establish specific policies to address ill~'l"Iiciency 
in the health sector. This requires that some benchmarks be explored lIsing illdicators 
drawn ti'om health facility inputs and outputs. This will form the basis I'llI' Illonitoring 
efticiency. The instruments and or tools will also enable health managers tll identify 
the sOllrces of inefficiency as well as the areas which present the greatest opportunity 
for real improvements in health care delivery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM: 
Since independence in 1963. Kenya's public health sector operated in a decentralized manner 
until the early 1970s when the government centralized management and authority over the sector 
(Cohen el "I 1995), This was associated with the government's policy to ensure fi'ee access to 
heahh care tor all users. However. serious economic .problems and demographic pressures and 
subsequent implementation of structural adjustment programmes has had a severe impact on 
financing for the health sector (Collins et.a! 1996; GOK. 1995a). Decreasing recurrent 
expenditure in health increased demand for health services and complex cpidl.!miological 
problems led to a renewed health sector decentralisation reform strategy in Kenya. 
The introduction and implementation of cost-sharing in government health facilities in l)ecember 
1989. which was meant to improve efficiency. quality, access and equity in health care delivery, 
did 110t bring any significant improvements (Collins el.a! 1996; Cohen et.al 1995: (10K 1995a). 
The deteriorating conditions in public sector !1ealth facilities, characterised by lack of curative 
patient carc items such as drugs and laboratory reagents. poorly maintained I11cdkal equipment 
and buildings and congestion. persisted. In response to these problems. thl.! government 
decentralized financial management of the cost-sharing programme. The decentralized financial 
management with regard to cost-recovery was meant to facilitate the use of revenue in a way that 
meets locally determined health service needs. leads to improved efficiency. quality and access 
to health care services (GOK 1995a; MOH 1999; Kireria et.a!1999). 
While decentralized financial management or decentralisation in general is expected to 
improve efficiency, access and quality of care, in practice, the desired policy objectives 
may not be achieved (Mills el al.. 1990, WHO 1996). Ineffective forms of 
decentralisation can lead to fragmentation· of health care services (Kutzin 1995). 
Moreover. the transfer of authority. resources and functions from Ministry of Health to 
district health facilities may not necessarily achieve the decentralisation objectives 
(which are efficiency, equity. access and quality of health service) unless accompanied by 
complementary support services (Kutzin 1995; Thomson el ai., 1991; Cassels 1995). 
Although health planners and policy makers hold strong beliefs about the policy with 
respect to its effects on the dynamic technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. access 
and equity aspects. there is little or no evidence bearing on these propositions. Studies 
that have been conducted do not address the impact of decentral ized linancial 
management on efficiency of health care facil:ities. Neither has the level of savings as a 
result of implied efficiency improvements been ascertained (MOB. 1999; Owino el ai 
1999: Cohen el £II .. 1995). Equally missing is any specific individual country study that 
examines the implications of fiscal decentralisation on technical efficiency and health 
care prmision. 
These issucs are important decision inputs in trying to establish if there is all) cliect of 
policy changes on delivery of health care. Needless to add. it is important to obtain 
insighls into how the facilities are performing under the decentralized cost sharing 
re\'enue and for proposing ways in which facility performance could be enhanced and 
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4. Consider policy implications emerging from this evaluation 
1.2.3 Hypothesis of the dissertation 
To guide this study in arriving at meaningful results, the following null hypotheses will 
be tested 
• Decentralisation of financial management of the cost-sharing programme has not 
improved technical efficiency. access and quality of service provision 
• There is no significant difference in efficiency among public health facilities before 
and after decentralisation of financial management of cost revenue sharing 
expcnditure and control. 
1.2.4 .'ustifieation for the Study 
Kenya like most developing countries has immense potential for enhancing health sector 
etlidency. equity. access and quality of service provision both in the short and long run. 
Cun·cntly. relatively little information exists on the impact of decentralized tinancial 
management of the cost-recovery. particularly with regard to emdenc) and the 
implications of promotin~ decentralisation of planning. In addition. not mllch has been 
explored with regard to the financial management system under the cost sharing scheme 
and its impact on ensuring financial sustainability, coverage, and access to health care. 
Therefore. any attempt to study fiscal decentralisation represents a veritahle source of 
improved decision making in relation to implementation of health sector reforms and 
more so 011 the delivery of health care services. 
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Quite often, health sector reforms have been implemented with little consideration for 
assessing their implications for service delivery (Kutzin 1994); yet this information is 
critical for the success of the reform. In most developing countries, there is a consricuous 
absence of evaluation of health sector reform. In Kenya, there is limited knowledge about 
the nature of financial management reform policy, its effectiveness in enhancing 
efficiency. the amount of saving levels arising from improved efficiency jf any or about 
the factors that hinder or influence the strategy's effectiveness (Kireria el.al 1999; MOH 
1999). This study seeks to contribute to the decentralization reform policy debate by 
assessing the available evidence on this reform initiative. 
Decentralisation of financial management has ml;ljor policy implications because it is not 
only meant to improve the perfomlance of the cost-sharing programme, but also to affect 
coverage. access equity and quality of health care services. Needless to add. inl()nnation 
on the performance of this reform strategy would provide guidance on how the health 
sector could be reorganized to promote efficiency. This information informs important 
poli(y issues as there are moves to decentralize 'the entire health sector illduding the 
release or Block grants and treasury allocations to the health facilities (GOK 1995a, 
Kireria d.lIl 1999). Further, an evaluation of decentralisation is important for the 
following reasons: It is only by evaluating the impact of the fiscal decentralisation reform 
that one can explore hypotheses conceming the efficiency differentials in health facility 
perlc.HI11 i.1I1 ce 
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The ability to quantify efficiency levels of health facilities would provide decision-
makers. hospital managers and health planners with tools for. monitoring the performance 
of the facilities in terms of resource use and management. In some cases. theory provides 
no guidance concerning the impact of health sector reform on facility perfi.mnance. In 
such a situation. empirical evaluation provides useful qualitative and quantitative 
evidence (Cassels. 1995). Thus. there is a need to undertake this study to illuminate the 
implications of financial decentralisation on health facility efficiency and the factors 
influencing its success as a guide to policy design, formulation and implementation. 
1.2.5 Organisation of the remaining chapters 
Chapter 2 gives the definition of various key concepts relevant to this study. a brief 
oven'ie\\' of different types of decentralisation and circumstances under which each of 
them is implemented. or degree of autonomy in fiscal management and control. It then 
discuses the main findings of fiscal decentralisation and decentralisation in gl:neraL and 
highlights the limitations and/or the factors that need to be put in place if the reform 
polil:Y is to achieve the stated objectives. Background and implementation of linancial 
management reform in Kenya is also provided in this chapter. Finally. the chapter 
discusst!s the conceptual framework used in the study. It discusses approaches for 
entiuating efficiency. access and quality of services. 
Chapt~r 3 fi.ll:uses on the field methodology of the study. The chapter describl;!s the study 
design. sampling method and sample size. the nature. source and type of data. It also 
discllsses reliability and validity of interview. instruments, ethical issues. data analysis, 
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management and quality assurance. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of the 
study. 
In chapter 4, the results of the study are presented. Description and explanation of the 
results is presented in this chapter. This includes descriptive statistics, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) efficiency levels and regression results. 
Chapter 5 analyses the results presented in chapter 4. Basically, it examines the extent to 
which the study objectives have been realised. Ways of improving the slI<.,:{,:ess of the 
reform in Kenya's health delivery system are also addressed. 
Lastly. chapter 6 provides a summary of the key findings of the study with refereJ.1ce to 
etliciency. quality and objectives of decentralisation of financial management of cost 
sharing. Finally. the chapter provides suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Decentralisation has been a key part of many developing countries' reform agenda, 
although it has been pursued to different degrees and in different ways (Bennett 1998). 
However. to date. there are many contradictions and arguments regarding its effect, its 
overt and hidden costs, the tradeoff between the costs and potential saving, and 
requirements for successful implementation (Munar 1997, Kutzin 1995). Besides, few 
studies have attempted to evaluate its impact on the policy objectives. Thus. relatively 
little is known about the effectiveness of the fiscal or financial decentralisation reform, its 
impact on hospital efficiency. delivery of health care, and the conditions required to 
ensure its successful implementation. 
2.1.2 Structure of literature review 
Beton: re\·iewing the literature on decentralisation. it is important to ex <1111 i ne the 
meaning of certain concepts used in the dissertation. Section 2.2 presents the definitions 
or \'ariolls key concepts relevant to this study. namely decentralisation. fiscal 
decentralisation. cost sharing. efficiency. equity, access and quality of care. Section 2.3 
provides a brief overview of different types of decentralisation, namely deconcentration, 
denJlution. delegation and privatization. It discusses the circumstances under which each 
of these torms is implemented and. or the degree of autonomy in fiscal management and 
control. 
8 
Section 2.4 presents other relevant literature ~s well as background and implementation 
of financial management reform under the cost sharing programme in Kenya. Section 2.5 
discusses the conceptual framework used in this study. 
2.2 Meaning of decentralisation 
Decentralization refers to the transfer of authority or dispersal of power in planning, 
management and decision-making from the national level to the sub-national levels 
(M i lis el al.. 1990; Rondinelli et al.. 1983; WHO 1993; Litvack et.al. 1998). The concept 
is complex and can take a variety of forms depending on a country's political 
administrative structure. objectives for decentralization and organizational structure of 
the health system (Alam el al 1994, Cassels 1995, Reagon et al 1997, Mills el al. 1990, 
Litvack el al 1998). The commonly known· forms of decentralisation include; 
deconcentration. devolution and delegation. In each case however, significant authority 
and responsibility is retained by the central government, particularly in rdation to 
functional responsibility. regulation. policy making. coordinating and monitoring roles 
(Bennett 1998). 
2.2.1 Ill'concentration 
This is the most common type of decentralisation and is characterised by transfer of 
sJx:cilic functions to sub-national units within ministries or other sector specific agencies. 
It involn!s the transfer of administrative rather than political power to one or more levels 
of" g(HWnment. In this model. lower levels will have fairly limited power of" tkcision-
making and little influence over allocation of resources. The lower k:vels of 
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administration are accountable upwards to the central government offices. This fonn of 
decentralisation is aimed at strengthening the district level management bodies such as 
health management boards. The branch offices are expected to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of servi'ce delivery (Brijlal et al. 1998). In Kenya, a notable example is 
the district health management teams (DHMTs) that have been established to deal with 
operational activities specifically in the areas of health prevention. supportive 
supervision. production and the provision of services within the framework of a primary 
or basic level of care (Munar 1997). The local administrative offices are accountable to 
the central government. In terms of autonomy in fiscal management and control. some 
degree of autonomy in decision-making authority may be delegated but they rnrely have 
full responsibility for these functions. 
2.2.2 Delegation 
Under delegation government transfers responsibilities for decision making and 
administration of public functions over certain areas of the government to semi-
autonomous organizations that are not wholly controlled by the central gO\'L'rnmcnt but 
only indirectly controlled by it. Although the central government retains authority over 
some services as well as policy regulations, the delegated agencies are ac<.:ountable to 
central government. but they have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. Ilospital . . 
Bonrds or Parastatals or teaching hospitals offer the best example for this form of 
de<.:entml ization. The degree of autonomy of the corporation is lIsually legally 
estnblished. 
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policy initiatives (Cohen et.a/ 1995). The major policy streams are (1) decentralisation to 
lower levels of the government administration across all sectors of the economy in 1983; 
the district focus for rural development; (2) decentralisation to lower levels qf the 
Ministry of Health Administration; the District Health Management Teams. 1975-79 and 
(3) the creation of District Health Management Boards in 1992 to oversee the revenue 
collection and supportive supervision of cost sharing programme among others. The 
decentralisation of financial management of the cost sharing revenue falls under this 
stream. 
The minor streams are (I) creation of autonomous institutions: Kenyatta National 
HospitaL (2) the Bamako initiative, a community based health financing mechanism 
introduced in 1989 by the MOH and UNICEF for promoting primary health care services 
and (3) decentralisation to private health care providers (for-profit and not-for-profit 
pro\·iders). The last three streams have had very minimal impact in influencing the 
decentralisation process in Kenya. 
2.2.6 Fiscal or financial decentralisation 
final1l:ial i decentralisation is a core component of decentralisation (Zhang and Zou 
19(7). It refers to the transfer of revenue raising, management and control and 
expenditure responsibilities to the lower levels of government. In relation to cost sharing, 
I In this study liscal decentralisation is used to refer to the decentralisation of financial nHllwgelllent of the 
cost sharing rewnue in the health sector. In essence therefore. what we have in Kenya is "parlial fiscal 
d~centralis;ltion" of the revenue expenditure as opposed to a comprehensive fiscal decentrnlisntion which 
grants complete autonomy in so far as the revenue collection and spending is concerned. The primary 
concern of the study is therefore on decentralisation of cost-sharing revenue expenditure in the health sector 
and its influence on the health sector efficiency in the delivery of health care. Caution should therefore be 
exercised when interpreting financial/fiscal decentralisation in the context of this study. 
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it refers to the shifting of responsibilities for decision making about the collection and 
expenditure of revenues to the district (WHO 1995). It can take various forms including, 
self-financing or cost recovery through user charges, co-financing, or expansion of local 
revenues th~ough taxati~n or community funding. It is meant to improve quality of 
sen·ice. access and efficiency by creating more accountability to local gll\\:rnance 
structures. greater consumer involvement and increased community participation. The 
degree of autonomy of the district in revenue collection and control is important in 
determining the extent of fiscal or financial decentralisation in the health sector. This 
study is concerned with the decentralisation of financial management system under the 
cost-sharing scheme. The current system could thus be equated to "partial fiscal 
decentralisation". The results should therefore be interpreted taking this information into 
account. 
2.2.7 Cost sharing in the context of health care delivery 
This refers to the user fees paid by consumers of public health services at the point and 
time of receiving health care services (Beattie el 01 .. 1996: pp. 9). It is supported on the 
grounds of its potential of achieving allocative efficiency through the reallocation of 
additional resources generated and on technical efficiency through the purchasing of 
inputs e.g. drugs. equipment maintenance and other essential inputs (Gilson allJ Mills 
1995 pp. 283). In addition. it is expected to'improve quality of health services and/or 
equit~ in service delivery and dissuade unnecessary use of health services, However, 
there is considerable debate in the literature as to whether these potential benefits of cost 
sharing are actually achieved. 
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Combined. the two measures provide a measure of total economic efficiency. Thus, a 
hospital is said to be technically inefficient if it could have produced the same amount 
and quality of patient care with fewer resources than it consumed. Alternatively. it 'could 
have produced the maximum amount of output with the same amount of resources it used 
(Shennan 1984). This study concentrates on the impact of fiscal decentralisation of the 
cost sharing revenue on technical efficiency due to inaccessibility of input prices. 
2.2.11 Access to health senrices 
Reagon e/ ai.. (1997) define access in terms of the range of available quality services. 
Access is closely linked to utilisation levels and is affected by perceived quality of 
sen'ices. cost of services (fees. travel cost. other treatment costs, fonnal barriers e.g. user 
fees policy. exemption policies. geographical and physical barriers (Braveman 1998) 
2.2.12 lltilis1ltion of health senrices 
According to Braveman (1998). utilisation of health care services refers to the actual 
receipt of seJ'\'ices or the actual coverage of the population with services. in addition to 
the a\'ailabilit~ of services. The measurement of actual utilisation of health sL'rvices is 
important because it helps determine whether health care is actually delivered and used. 
In thL' context of this study. it will help establish whether notable changes in health care 
utilisation rates has occurred as a result of decentralisation of financial management 
reform. According to Reagon el at. (1997). utilisation is influenced by multiple factors 
related to demand and supply. 
2.3 BROAD OBJECTIVES OF DECENTRALISATION/FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
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2.3.1 Objectives in the context of health care delivery and financing 
Many developing countries have or are in the process of implementing decentralisation 
and in particular, decentralized decision-making in financial management matters. 
Numerous international experiences and discussions on fiscal decentral isation or 
decentralisation in general have advanced a number of arguments, both for and against 
the policy. Firstly, fiscal decentralisation or decentralisation in general is supported on 
the assllmption that it would lead to improved efficiency, equity and access to health care 
services that arise from taking resources closer to people or implementing financial 
management policy reform within district health facilities. This is based on the fact that 
decisions about expenditure taken at the local level are more likely to reflect the demands 
of the local community. Secondly. it may reduce bureaucracy and as a result. make the 
cenLral government and health administration more flexible, accountable. and responsive 
to local needs. Thirdly; it is pursued to achieve political objectives such as political 
stability. increased government responsiveness to the needs of different interest groups, 
mobilizing support for national development programs and encouraging self reliance 
among subordinate units of administration (Litvack 1998; Kutzin 1995: WHO 1996; 
Berman 1995: Reagon el af.. 1997: Kolehmainen-Aitken and Newbrander ] (97). 
According to WHO (1995). decentralisation within the health sector is introduced in 
pursuit of following objectives: to improve management of service delivery. strengthen 
performance of public health facilities and address resource shortages and inel'liciencies 
of the centralized system through local resource mobilization and cost colltainment 
(WHO 1995). Further. by separating the twin objectives of efficiency und equity, 
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decentralisation could allow service providers to charge user fees and focus on cfticiency 
and use the revenue to expand coverage and improve equity, which can benefit the poor 
(Litvack e/.al 1998: Ill). They note that, quaiity in the delivery of service can be 
achieved if all or significant responsibility and autonomy in planning and management of 
human and financial resources for the health facilities are given to facility managers. In 
this way. hospital (or other health facility) managers will be able to acquire the necessary 
inputs e.g. drugs. equipment and staff. 
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This section provides a review of studies on the impact of financial management on 
hospital efficiency, studies on the approaches of efficiency measurel11l:nt and the 
experience of decentralisation in general in various countries. On the basis of this, the 
section presents and discusses the analytical framework used in this study. 
2 .... 1 Review of Related Studies 
For Illllch ot' the last one decade. health poli'cy makers have been concerned with the 
perl{)l'l11anCe of their health systems and many developing countries have intl'oduced 
rdtll'llls aimed at improving performance (Kutzin 1995: Collins el.al 1999: World Bank 
199-k Brijlal el.al 1998). Some of the reforms ~ing implemented across sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) relate to decentralisation of decision making to health districts (e.g. 
dl:centralisation of financial management). health care financing and public/pri\'ate mix, 
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The debate on the impact of decentralisation of financial management or dect:ntral isation 
in general is a new phenomenon in most developing countri~s. In the debate. while there 
is more consensus on the potential of the reform effect on efficiency' and quality issues, 
there is considerable uncertainty about its influence on hospital efficiency in tht: delivery 
of health services (Kutzin 1995; Mills et.al. 1990; WHO 1996). An understanding of 
these issues requires an in-depth examination of health facility performance and 
productivity enhancing measures to promote the success of the reform. 
A vailable empirical evidence suggests that decentralisation in general may t:nhance 
efficiency. lead to macroeconomic stability and institutional demands on the 
dt:ct:ntralist:d units. Zhang and Zou (1997). argues that fiscal decentralisation may lead 
to hospital efficiency in service delivery by moving decision making closer to service 
delivery point. This is necessary, as it would create local governance structures 
accountable to the users of public health services. Litvack et.al (1998) has argued, 
without t:mpirical corroboration. that in order to enhance efficiency in the delivery of 
ht:alth care st:rvices. it is imperative to match fiscal decentralisation and administrative 
arrangements. Gi Ison and others (1995). Beatie el. al (1996) haw argut:d that 
decentralisation of user fee collection may have a positive impact on tt:c1mical efficiency 
irtht: re\"enut: collected is used to finance the purchase of inputs (drugs. equiplllt:nt or in 
the rt:habil itation of facilities). They further observe that access can be improved through 
impw\"t!d waiver and exemption mt:chanisms. These arguments notwithstanding. there is 
conflicting t:vidence as to the relationship betwe.en decentralisation and d'liciency, in 
particular with regard to revenue generation. The contention then is that. for fiscal 
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decentralisation to be effective. the reform should enable providers to focus on efficiency 
and then use the revenue to expand coverage or improve quality. 
More recently. the issue of the impact of fiscal decentralisation has been awakened by 
continued wide spread inefficiencies in public health facilities despite decentralized 
decision milking to the district level. Litvack (1998) notes that the success of 
fiscal/financial decentralisation requires a comprehensive approach, rather than a one-off 
piecemeal reform such as cost recovery. This implies that fiscal decentralisation should 
take account of managerial capacity. resource management and other systems change that 
help capture the efficiency gains that are at the heart of fiscal decentralisation. This may 
mean training local personnel in planning, resource allocation and lItilization 
management in order to enhance both allocative and technical efficiency and 
effecti\"eness of the health care delivery system. 
Reagon ('I 01.. (1997) suggest that the decentralisation of financial management within a 
decentralized management structure must carefully consider certain principles of 
tinancial management in order to enhance efficiency, equity and quality of health care 
pnn·ision. It is in this connection that they identify some specific issues in ensuring 
success or the decentralized financial reform. These include the following: 
• Decentralisation with authority for financial control at the decentralised 
administrative structures at the lower levels 
• Erticient and effective budgetary allocation in order to ensure proper lise or resources 
to achieve maximum health gains at the lowest costs 
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• Financial allocations that promote equity in the distribution of health services 
• Strengthening the role of communities in decision making in order to attain district 
health goals 
The principle that is of key importance to this study is the decentralisation of financial 
management and expenditure control and its implications for technical efficiency. 
Cohen el al .. (1995), in a study on Kenya's experience with decentralisation for the 
period between 1983/84 to 1989/90. found that decentralisation resulted in a sharp 
increase in' administrative costs and a decline in utilisation levels. Taking the 
expenditure/output ratio as an indicator for efficiency, they found a marked increase in 
cost/output ratio implying a decline in efficiency. No attempt however. \vas made to 
examine the impact of fiscal decentralisation on efficiency and health care delivery. The 
study was undertaken before the decentralisation of financial management systems. 
Ho\\'e\'l~r. Ihe study provides some insights' about the effects of decentral isation on 
hospital performance. For instance. the increase in costs may be associated with a decline 
in efficicncy. Further. the study coincided with the implementation of the cost-sharing 
programme. hence the observed responses may partly be attributable to increased costs of 
implementing cost-sharing scheme. The findings tie with comprehensive studies of the 
impact of cost sharing on utilisation rates. It should however, be noted th<lt the policy 
rcf()rm may not necessarily be associated with th~ changes in efficiency and uti I isation 
and caus<llity was not established in this study. Caution should therefore be exercised in 
thc interpretation of these results. 
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In a budgetary analysis study to examine ways of enhancing efficiency in resource 
allocation and health care delivery, Kireria et al., (1999), observed that decentralisation 
of budget allocations has the potential to reduce facility costs on travel because authority 
to incur expenditure (AlEs) will be done at the district level. The study notes that most 
facilities spend a larger portion of the revenue collected on travel costs. DecenLralisation 
of financial management would therefore led to savings. Further, it would provide' more 
time for the health managers to engage in policy analysis and formulation. and finally 
improve efficiency in the financial performance of the health facilities. A key policy issue 
that arises however. is the potential conflict between achieving financial sustainability on 
one hand. and ensuring efficiency. quality and equity in health care delivery on the other. 
This is basically because there is a tendency of health managers to colll.:cnLrate on 
improving revenue collected at the expense of the other policy objectives. Thus, 
implementation of decentralisation. including the decentralisation of planning. budgeting 
and financial management should be promoted in a way that ensures the achievement of 
the multiple objectives of financial su~tainability. improved efficiency and equity. The 
conclusion then is that. the decentralisation reform strategy should fOCllS more on the 
optimal usc of resources at the district level and prioritize activities at the national level 
in a \\ay that \\ould address the multiple objectives. 
Sc\"eral of the more recent studies (Collins el al.. 1996; Beattie et af .. 1996: World Bank 
199-1-: Russell and Gilson 1995) have argued. that perverse incentives introduced with 
cost recovery schemes are responsible for poor delivery of service by health facilities. In 
addition. empirical evidence shows that the failure to achieve efficiency goals arises from 
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low efficiency in collecting revenue and the failure to match revenue generating 
objectives on one hand and access to services on the other hand. 
Kutzin (1995) further demonstrates that wide spread waste of resources. especially in 
drug procurement. storage and in prescription and low productivity implies that only a 
small percentage of the revenue retained is used in enhancing facility performance. He 
notes that.· the extent .of decentralisation ·of financial management (that is. the 
organization and managerial context in which they are applied), critically determines the 
effectiveness of user fees in achieving its objectives. The main conclusion from the'study 
was that. the success of financial reform in addressing inefficiency. equity and quality 
issues largely depends on active participation of the ministry of health in the financing, 
organization and regulation of the decentralized administrative units. 
Kolehmainen-Aitken and Newbrander (1997) and Cohen el.al (1995) have slW\\1l that the 
reluctance by the central administration to relinquish the control of funds or release 
sufficient funds that meet the demands of the new responsibilities can greatly undermine 
the potential value of user fees. According to Shar (1997), decentralisation can and 
should be given greater weight to ensure that local mobilization is maintained and that 
local institutions are capable of carrying out the corresponding expenditure 
responsihilities. Mills (1994) further points out that efficiency in health care delivery may 
be compromised by financial decentralisation of revenue use and collection hecause the 
economies of scale that existed prior to decentralisation may be compromised upon 
implementation. While' this may be true~ it should be noted. hm\'e\w. that, 
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1992/93-1997/98. Levell hospitals were found to have higher technical efliciency scores 
compared to level 2 or 3. The range of overall level of technical inefficiency for the three 
levels of hospitals examined was 35.1 to 46.8 per cent. Most of the hospitals in the 
sample were found to be operating below the best-observed frontier with only 12.8 per 
cent of the liospitals reported to be efficient compared to their peers. Bed occupancy and 
ALOS variables were negatively related to hospital inefficiency. Based on the above 
results. the author concluded that significant amount of savings could be realised if the 
health facilities were operating at efficiency levels. 
Jacobs (2000) compared efficiency rankings from cost indices derived from a 
deterministic regression (CCL 2CCI and 3CCI) and those obtained from IJEA and 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SCF). The results showed that there was a marked 
difference i~ trust efficiencies between DEA 'and the cost indices. Comparison of SCF 
and DEA methods showed a higher consistency in the efficiency rankings. The 
interpretation of these results should be treated with caution because of eXfstence of 
in(onsistency across the different approaches. The presence of random 'noise' however, 
makes the author to conclude that the large discrepancy in efficiency between the trusts 
may be mueh lower than is reported. Despite the inconsistent of the results. the author 
notes that. the two approaches do have some agreement within specifications and may 
complement one another. In a related study. Banker el,al (1986) shO\ved that with 
translog methods. the hospitals exhibited CRS. whereas the DEA results showed both 
increasing (IRS) and decreasing returns (DRS) to scale. Comparison of estimates of 
technical efficiencies generated from the two methods showed that DEA estimates were 
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highly related to the capacity utilisation, but the estimates from the translog specification 
did not show such relationship. 
A study by Gerdtham et .al (1999) estimates the impact of internal market reform on 
hospital efficiency. They compared county councils, which had decentralised their 
internal resource allocation system into a comprehensive system of internal markets. with 
other councils still relying on the traditional budget system. The new reform was aimed at 
introducing a new set of incentives for the publicly owned health care faci I ities to use 
available resources more efficiently. The findings show that the councils that changed 
their internal resource allocation into an output-based reimbursement system had higher 
efliciency scores. whilst efficiency in hospitals prior to the reform did not differ between 
the county council hospitals which implemented internal markets with output-based 
reimhursement and those which did not. The difference in efficiency is attributed to 
tinancing reforms. Other factors influencing efficiency e.g. waiting time for operations 
and other reforms introduced during the same time were found to have lillie effect 
het.:ause the)" \\fere implemented simultaneously in all the county council hospitals. A 
similar study by Fare el. al (1995) on productivity change in Swedish hospitals during the 
reii.mn period reported similar findings. Using DEA-based Malmclliis/ productivity 
indices. the results show that productivity efficiency of hospitals declined duri ng the pre-
relonn period. 
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2.4.3 Kenya's experience with user fees and decentralisation 
Health care decentralisation in Kenya arises from a combination of demographic and 
economic pressures. Increased demand for quality health services and poor economic 
performance has limited the government's capacity to provide health services of 
acceptable quality. In Kenya. the decentralisation of cost sharing revenue expenditure in 
puolic health sector is expected to strengthen and empower districts and individual public 
heath facilities in order for them to develop. manage and build capacities in modem 
management and planning (GOK 1995a; Kireria et.al 1999; Owino and Korir 1997). 
Ultimately. it should lead to increase in coverage and accessibility of health services 
through optimal resource utilisation at the district level since it implies closer i Iltcraction 
between provider and consumers of health care at the community level. 
The implementation of the district focus for rural development in the early I 970s laid the 
foundation for decentralisation in Kenya. which was extended. to the health sector. With 
regard to the Ministry of Health. it wa~ meant to strengthen the management capacities of 
health Ilu:ilities at the district level. In 1992 districts were given more responsihilities and 
authority in decision making with the creation of the District Health Management Boards 
with a "iew to manage the district health facilities (Cohen el.al 1995). Sp..:ci lically. they 
were meant' to oversee the collection and use of the cost sharing revenue. and ensure 
increased cost effectiveness'and efficiency in service delivery (MOH 19(6). 
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2.4.4 Introduction and Implementation of financial management reform 
Cost-sharing in Kenya's public health sector was promulgated in the 1984/88 National 
Development plan. reiterated in policy documents, and implemented in 1989 (Collins et 
al.. 1994; Kireria et.al 1999). Before 1994, the cost sharing revenue was characterised by 
centralized revenue collection and centralized·fiscal transfers, that is, the user fees were 
remitted to treasury and allocated back to the health facilities according to prescribed 
expenditure needs. Its management was entrusted with the health care financing division 
at the Ministry of Health Headquarters. The main objective of the policy was to generate 
additional revenue at facilities from users of public health facilities which should then be 
utilised ftll' improving efficiency. quality and access to health care (ibid.). Service 
delivery efficiency was to be improved by creating savings through the elimination of 
excess staff. and other improvements in the use of health resources by Llsing erJiciency 
sayings tog.ether with cost sharing to increase the provision of health care (Quick and 
Musau 199 ... ). 
A task Ic.lrce was set up to oversee the collection and effective use of the revenue 
generated tj'OIll cost-sharing. strengthen implementation, approve expenditure plans, 
monitor progress. supervise and deal with the many problems of misunderstanding and 
mismanagement in the public health facilities (MOH 1994). Needless to say. such a 
hea\'~ workload on the central staff (which was understaffed and under fUIH.h:d). meant 
that the technical staff co'uld not cope (Stover et al 1996; MOH 1999; Owino 1(97). For 
instance. routine supervision, training and monitoring ground to a halt. and management 
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was essentially conducted through eirculatS and rescue rtHssions to the field whenever 
major problems were reported (Quick 1995). 
However. as patients paid more. conditions in the' public facilities continued to deteriorate 
despite the introduction of the cost-recovery policy. The facilities could nol obtain the 
essential inputs on time ostensibly because' it took too much time for the central 
administration to approve the budget plans or authority to incur expenditure (AlEs). As a 
result most facilities lacked essential drugs and laboratory reagents. had poorly 
maintained medical equipment. and low staff morale and congestion persisted (Owino et 
al,. 1997: Quick 1995). Evidence of long queues, long waiting lists for admission at the 
referral hospitals. long stays in hospital, poor diagnosis and treatment became common 
(ibid,) 
Against this background, the decision to decentralise management of cosl-recovery 
re\'enuc generated at the facility to the district level received heightened attention (M0H, 
1994 and MOH 1999). The new system was first implemented on a pilot basis in three 
prO\'inces namely: Western Province in June 1994" and the Coast and Eastern Province in 
February and July 1996. Respectively, the pilot tests lasted for five months. after which 
the programme was introduced in other Provinces. At the top of the agenda was the 
transfer of financial, management with respect to cost recovery, to be follovvcd by the 
release of "h/ock grants" to the district. which were meant to replace the inflexible 
ministry's line item budgets. The district health management teams and boards (DHMTs 
and DI-IMBs) were meant to undertake the following main responsibilities: 
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• To support and oversee the revenue collection and supervision of the cost sharing 
program 
• Enhance authority in financial management with emphasis on the issuance of AlEs 
• Monitor. evaluate and regulate the quality and standard of health care delivery at the 
district level 
• Approval of expenditure plans and issuance of sub-authority to incur expenses 
• Training of DHMBs/DHMTs and submission of routine district and provincial 
financial reports. 
All these functions were meant to improve efficiency, access and quality ill the provision 
of health care at the public health facilities. Further, it was hoped that financial 
decentralisation would provide the most appropriate way to spend the cost sharing funds 
(Collins 1995) However. the health care financing division within the ministry 
headquarters retained responsibility for developing policies, supervision. and monitoring 
of progress in addition to liasing with other stakeholders. The most hasiL l'collomic 
argument in favour of financial decentralisation has to do with the notion (lr l'f!iciency 
savings. It is evident from the framework that decentralized fiscal reform could be 
equated \\'ith devolution as authority was transferred to autonomous and independent 
units in the form of DHMBs/DHMTs, while Ministry of Health care Financing Division 
retained slipervisory functions. Under the new arrangement, DHMBs usslimed the 
responsi hil i ty of planning for district health services. 
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2.4.5 Policy issues 
Decentralisation of financial management was implemented .at the district ticr with high 
expectations of improving efficiency, access, coverage and quality of public health care. 
Decentralized decision-making supports these·changes by facilitating the use of revenue 
in ways that meet locally determined health service needs (Gilson eral 19(6). These 
anticipated benefits notwithstanding. fears have been expressed concerning the 
performance of the public health facilities (Kireria 1999). Against this background, a 
nurnber of policy questions arise, particularly relating the country's performance with the 
financial reform to the district level namely: 
• Is the system relevant in addressing the efficiency. equity and access objectives which 
it was set? 
• Has emciency In cost-recovery improved because of improved motivation at the 
facility level? 
• HO\\ has the system balanced the mUltiple objectives of revenue collection with 
impnJ\'ed efficiency. access. quality of care and equity? 
• To \\'hat extent has the reform enhanced technical efficiency in puhlic health 
facilitit.:s'? Have the hospitals registered any change in productivity and to what degree 
can this be associated with the decentralisation reform under investigation? 
• What amount of savings can be attained from improved efficiency if any? 
These policy issues are important because they are not meant merely to provide guidance 
on the patormance of the cost-recovery programme, but more importantly. to determine 
ho\\' the implementation of fiscal decentralisation could be enhanced with a view to 
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improving efficiency, quality, coverage and access to quality health care services. A vital 
step in carrying out this study is to provide baseline infonnation to the ministry as it 
moves to decentralize the entire health sector, including the release of block grants and 
treasury allocations to the facilities. 
2.4.6 Summary of relevant issues 
The debate on decentralisation in general and its implied impact on efficiency. access. 
equity and quality of health care services has received much attention in the recent past. 
However. notwithstanding the rich debate on the decentralisation of the cost sharing 
revenue in the recent past, there is a conspicuous absence of clear evidence fi'om critical 
appraisals of fiscal decentralisation within the health sector. Furthermore. the limited 
a\'uiJahle evidence does not allow concrete conclusions to be drawn about the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on efficiency improvements or even whether efficiency in health 
care delivery has occurred in practice. In short. there is little evidence that can he lIsed to 
contirm the 'implied benefits of dece:ntralisation of cost recovery revenue. As such. the 
evidencc about whether fiscal decentralisation does indeed improve etliciency. C(luity or 
quality in service delivery still remains unclear. Thus. there is a need to critically 
examine the issue of fiscal decentralisation of cost sharing revenue in order 10 establish 
its impact on hospital efficiency and in the delivery of health care services in 1.111.' country. 
2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Attempts to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralisation or decentralisation ill gelleral on 
efliciency. equity. access and quality of care have been based on indicators specific to 
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each of these policy objectives (Kutzin 199;; McPake and Kutzin 1997~ and WHO 1993). 
The tendency therefore has been to examine the changes in the indicators reiatt!u to each 
of the policy objectives and draw general inferences. 
Based on information from the literature review the conceptual framework below consists 
of three main levels of effects. Firstly, the effects of fiscal decentralisation on quality, 
access, efficiency in revenue collection and use and the effects of financial 
decentralisation on hospital technical efficiency. 
2.5. J Impact on perceived quality of care 
It \\iII be possible that facilities will provide quality (proxied by availability or drugs, 
courteous staff. shorter waiting time etc) and more comprehensive health care st:rvices as 
they' achieve more responsibility in decision making on the type of services to offer 
according to community needs. Quality has both supply and demand side characteristics. 
The critical demand issue is perceived quality: the consumer's assessment or thL' relative 
quality or different health care providers. It is thus an implicit indicator or ul i lisation 
paHerns (to measure the user's experience with the available health care (Barnulll and 
Kutzin 1993: Gilson et.;ll 1994). In addition differences in perceived quality of care 
pro\'idc an important explanation of why some patients/users of health can: services 
bypass I()\rcr health facilities and refer themselves directly to district/sub-district facilities 
despite high cost in terms of time and cost of servi~e . 
.,., 
.J_ 
In the context of fiscal decentralisation in Kenya, infonnation on quality of care is 
critical to assess whether the revenue generated has been used to improve the quality of 
services. Moreover, supply-side factors such as adequate and motivated staff: drug 
availability etc influence actual quality of services that are important in affecting 
perceived quality (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). In addition, infonnation from both the 
patients and staff would implicitly reveal the problem areas of the refornl polky and how 
they can systematically be resolved. 
2.5.2 The effects of financial decentralisation on access 
As Ilot...:u earlier. access refers to the range and availability of health services available in 
a !leahll facility. With the decentralisation of financial management. hospitals were 
expected to provide a wide range of health care services. Notwithst:mding this 
expectation.' access to health care may be affected unless regulatory actions (exemption 
and \\ain:r mechanisms) are taken to avert the negative consequences of th...: financial 
rl!ltmll policy. Thus. decentralisation associated with the introduction of cost sharing may 
ha\'t~ a n...:gative impact on access as measured by access indicators slII.:h as total 
olltpati...:nt and inpatient services provided (Zhang el.al ] 997). 
The positin.: katures of financial decentralisation notwithstanding, hospital p...:ri'onnance 
(as m...:asured by technical and allocative efficiency. access and quality of carc) may not 
h~l\"': immedint...: response given the constraints on public services and the in(cntives in 
til...: n...:\\ n.:lllrlll policy. 
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2.5.3 Cost recovery revenue 
Decentralised decision-making of the cost-sharing revenue is expected to enhance 
efticiency of hospitals in 'the delivery of health care in two ways. Firstly. it is L'xpected to 
remove delays of releasing the revenue from the health care financing division at the 
Ministry of Health headquarters which was responsible for planning and dishursement. 
Secondly. the retention and control of some portion of the revenue by the health care 
managers at the district level. would provide a critical incentive to cost recovery. 
Moreover. it would allow revenue to be used in ways that meet perceived quality 
weaknesses e.g. facilities would be able to address drug shortages, thus reducing the total 
cost of i.lccessing public services and encouraging the poor to use public senil"L's (Gilson 
el.u/ I (95). However, improvement in health care is determined by the adL'lluacy of the 
re\"el1l1e to allow the coverage and/or quality improvements. 
2.6 THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL DECENTRALISATION ON TECIINICAL 
EFFICIENCY 
Because or decentralisation of financial management of cost sharing revenue in the health 
sector. health facilities are expected to deliver health services without wastage of inputs 
ami at the minimum possible cost. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) developed hy Farrel 
( 1957) \\"i.\S used to evaluate the impact of fiscal decentralisation on technical L'fJiciency 
or hospitals. 
2.6.1 Efficiency measurement concepts 
Measuring efficiency in health care services is complicated by the nature of the output of 
sen' ices (i.e. the nature of the production process) and the variety of servicL's produced. 
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This is further complicated because in measuring efficiency of health care services the 
ideal output is real output (i.e. change in health status) is affected hy several 
socioeconomic and environmental factors which are not under the control of the DMUs 
(Eyob 2000). 
FnllO\\'ing the approach of Debreu (l95l) and Koopmans (1951). Farrel (1957) 
developed a measure of firm efficiency which accounts for multiple inputs and provides 
solution to the problems associated with the traditional average measures of evaluating 
efficiency of decision making unit. He proposed an efficiency measurement approach for 
comparing each DMU with only the "best" DMU in the peer group with the restriction 
that each DMU lie on or below the efficiency frontier. A firm is said to he technically 
efficient if it is operating on the revealed best practice (Coelli 1996). 
. . 
Under constant returns to scale assumption, Farrel demonstrated his notion or technical 
and allocative efficiencies using two inputs (xl and x2) to produce a single output (yl). 
Figure I shows the efficiency frontier which is the fundamental concept of I>EA. Any 
hospital on the frontier located on the isoquant is considered technically enicicnt and any 
Dt-.,1l 1 helow it is relatively less efficient and has an efficiency rating ofless than I (Coelli 
1(96). Thus. hospitals located on P. Q and M are technically efficient while those at 
points K and J are technically inefficient. The technical efficiency of this hospital is given 
hy the distance QK (which gives the amount by which the hospital could reducc its input 




Technical efficiency takes a value between zero and one, which indicates the degree of 
technical inefficiency of a decision making unit (a hospital). A technically efficient 
hospital has a value of 1 (hospital located at point Q) because it is on the efficient frontier 
(isoquant). while technically inefficient DMUs have a value less than one (hospital 
located at point K). Hospital K could therefore become efficient if it reduces its inputs 
and relocate to point Q. Thus, Q can be used as a threshold against which to measure the 
performance of the other DMUs (hospitals). 
The allocative efficiency (AE,,) is given by the ratio: 
AE" =OR 
OQ 





The distance denoted by RQ indicates the cost reduction if the hospital is to be 
allocatively efficient at point M. For allocative efficiency to be achieved, the isoquant 
must be tangent to the isocostline AB. Thus, based on this definition the hospitals located 
at points P and Q are technically efficient but allocatively inefficient. Only hospital M 
located at die point where isocostline is tangent to the isoquant is both technically and 
allocatively efficient. 
The total economic efficiency (TEE) is measured by the ratio: 
EEK = OR =!.Q.Q.l * (OR) 
OK (OK) (OQ) 
The three measures represent an input-output orientation since the concern is to produce 
the observed output with minimum inputs (Chamess el.aI1994). Alternatively. one could 
use the output-oriented measures of efficiencY which involve increasing Olltputs whilst 
keeping inputs the same (Coelli 1996). The commonly applied model is the inpll~-output 
orienlatioil because the input variables in many DMUs are the primary decision making 
variahles. This notwithstanding, the type of orientation used has little e/lCI.:I on the 
efliciency scores obtained (Eyob 2000: Coelli and Perelman 1996). 
Currently. there are two principal approaches for measuring the productiolJ frontiers 
namely: (I) the parametric approach that uses econometric methods (Jacobs. 2000; 
Anderson. 1980; Wouters, 1993): and (2) the non-parametric approaches tl1m LIse linear 
programming techniques (Coelli. 1996: Farrel, 1967), sLlch as, dala enve/opmel1l analysis 
(DE.·V. 
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2.6.2 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) is the optimisation method of mathematical 
programming that generalises Farrel's (1957) single-input/single output technical 
efficiency measure to the multiple-input/multiple-output case. Thus DEA is a technique 
for measuring technical efficiency. The original DEA was developed by Charness, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) with constant returns to scale assumption. and was extended 
by Banker.Charness and Cooper (1984) to include variable returns to scale. DEA measure 
is widely used in the evaluation and comparis'on of DMUs e.g. educational departments 
(schools. colleges and universities). health care (hospitals, clinics). agricultural 
production. banking. market research. benchmarking, index number, construction etc 
(Burgess el.al 1996; Bossofiane el.a/ 1991). DEA analyses the efficiency with which 
each DMU (in this study hospital) uses its inputs to produce a given level of output. It 
COlln:rts multiple inputs and outputs measures into a simple summary measure of 
producti\'l: efficiency. It determines the optimal input/output combinations <lnd represents 
it with the "best revealed frontier"'. DMUs that lie on the best practice frontier have an 
cfficicncy s~ore of one arid are technically efficient relative to their peers. The other peers 
arc assigned a score of between zero and one. 
The adnllltages of DEA over stochastic frontier models are: (1) converts inputs and 
outputs into a single measure of efficiency for each decision making unit. (:2) handles 
multiple inputs and outputs without the requirement for homogeneous measurements, (3) 
can adjust for exogenous variables that are outside the control of the management. (4) 
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does not require specific functional form relating inputs to outputs, so as to compute the 
efficiency of a DMU and lastly (5) it focuses on observed best practice fhmtier unlike 
stochastic frontier models which focuses on central tendency properties (('harness, 
Cooper. and· Rhodes 1978~ Kirigia el.ai 1999;. Eyob, 2000). However, one disadvantage 
with DEA is that. it does not consider random noise (i.e. non-stochastic) e.g. earth 
quakes. epidemics. war etc.). As a result. any deviation from the efficiency fI'ontier is 
assumed to be due to inefficiency. 
2.6.3 The DEA model 
The follmving linear programming problem based on the constant returns 10 scale 
assumption was estimated using DEAP software version 2.l (Coelli 1996: ('harness, 
Cooper and Rhodes. 1978). 
Max ho= 
Subject to 
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ur ~ 0; r =1.. ....... s and Vi~ 0; 1, .... , m 
= the hospital being evaluated in the set of j 1" .. , n hospitals 
= Observed amount of rlh (r L ... , s) input for the jth hospital 
'" Observed amow1t of ith (i = 1.. .. r) input for the jth hospi Lal. 
. Ur = Coefficient/weight for output 'r' to be determined from the data 
in the DEA model. 
VI = Coefficient/weight for input "i" to be determined from the data 
by the DEA model 
n number of hospitals in the sample 
s = the number of outputs 
u = the number of inputs 
Constant returns to scale assumes that the DMUs are optimal scale. However. in the case 
where Lhis does not hold, construction of a DEA model based on the asslimption of 
,'ariable returns to scale is estimated. The LP model is given below. 
1\1ax ho = I Ur Y~ll1 + UO 
St. ~ \', X'jn = 1 
I lIr YrJ - I Vi Xij + ui :5 o,j = L .... N 
lIr. ",2: 0 
(1) 
,,'here the notations are as given in equation 1. f.l.o indicates returns to scale whi 1st lJo ::s 
illdic..:rllcs dec.:reasing returns to scale, f.I.=O gives CRS whereas f.l.o ~ 0 is for inc..:reasing 
returns to scale. The scale efficiency is computed from equation (2). n:gmdless of 
whether the DMUs are operating on an optimal scale of production or not (Codli. 1996; 
Eyob 1(00). 
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2.6.4 The empirical DEA Model 
The current study redefines the relationship between the. variables identi tit:d in the 
literature into an input-output oriented model. The input-output model was lIsed in this 
study because the input variables are the primary decision making variables for which the 
health managers have control over unlike the demand factors which are exogenous and 
largely influenced by the health seeking behaviour of the public (Eyob. 2000: Fare et.al 
1995: Fare el a11994; and Gerdtham el al. 1999). 
The above model was used to derive efficiency scores for each hospital in thl." sample to 
assess the e~fect of fiscal decentralisation on ~ospital performance (technical cniciency). 
Efficiency scores were computed for the periods 1994-1995 and 1997-1 YYX. This is 
important in order to establish whether hospital perfonnance has improved as a result of 
decentralisationn of financial management of the cost sharing revenue. Three outputs 
describe actual perfonnance of the hospitals and are represented by (I) olitpatil!llt visits, 
(2) inpatient visits (inpatient days). and (3) cost-recovery ratio. Input resources are 
rcprcsl."llh.:d by (I) recurrent total expenditure (expenditure for labour and non-Iahour e.g. 
drugs. transport etc) and bed size (a proxy for hospital capacity). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This section outlines the study design, sampling method, data collection methods, the 
nature of data and information collected whilst in section 3.2 study limitalions are 
highlighted. A summary of the data collected and the method used is provi~k'd iii section 
3.3. The study utilized both secondary and primary data. The focus for the study was the 
district and sub-district hospitals because the management of the cost-recovery revenue 
was initially devolved to the district level. Thus, although provincial hospitals are the 
one:, mandated to approve AlEs. they are not directly involved in the financial 
managl'ment of the cost recovery revenue. hence were not included. This sllIdy would 
han? benefited from the inclusion of KenyattaNational Hospital and health ~l!l1tres. In 
particular. Kenyatta (example of delegation form of decentralisation) becausl' it has fully 
decentralised its financial management system and control. However. owing to time and 
tinan~ial ~onstraints it was not considered. 
3.1.2 Study design 
nul.' to thl! nature of the study problem. the study was designed to retrospectivdy collect 
data Ii.!!" the periods 1994-1995. and 1997-1998. representing pre and post rl.'li)rm period 
01" thl.' ~ost-sharing programme. taking 1994 as the base period. This approach \\i II help in 
assessing the impact of the decentralisation reform strategy on technical cflicil'IIl') and its 
etrecti\'\:nes~ in the deli~ery of health care services between the pre-and post-policy 
introdudion periods (McPake and Kutzin 1997). Within the districts. the unit 01" analysis 
was thl.' district hospitals and sub-district hospitals. 
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3.1.3 Sampling Methods and sample size 
A total of 822 public health facilities (district and sub-district hospitals) were considered 
for inclusion in this study. All facilities to be included in the sample were required to 
have complete information for the time periods 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998. This 
generated a total of 39 district and sub-district public health facilities. comprising 27 
district hospitals and 12 sub-district hospitals. The regional distribution was as follows: 
Eastern (I OJ. Nairobi (I), Coast (9), Rift Valley (4), North Eastern (2). Central (7), 
Nyanza (4) and Western (2). The sample desired size for the primary data collection was 
200 patients. both inpatients and outpatients and 60 health personnel staff. However, a 
total of I 78 patients and 57 health personnel were ultimately interviewed. 
3.1.4 The nature and type of data 
The study utilized both primary and secondary data. Initially time series secondary data 
on the selected facilities was obtained from the Ministry of Health headquarters. 
lnltlflnation ·obtained included. levels of utilisation (annual outpatients and inpatients). 
number of beds. cost recovery revenue and actual recurrent expenditure. This information 
was obtained from Health Information System's department (HIS) and Health Care 
Finam:ing office in the Ministry of Health. The data correspond to the time periml before 
ami alicr decentralisation of financial management of cost sharing revenue to the district 
Jeyel. Primary data was coIJected from 4 purposively selected facilities. Tn selecting the 
districts. the study took into account the agro-ecoIogical zones (high. mediulll. low and 
; currell\l~. there are 67 district hospitals and several sub-district hospitals. Out of the 82 health fi.lcilities 
that met the criteria identified were included in the sample. This generated a total of27 out of 67 district 
hospitnls and 12 sub-district hospitals out of the total 22 considered for inclusion in the study. 
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marginal potential) in order to capture the varied and unique characteristics of the various 
districts in Kenya including differences in epidemiological and demographic profiles. 
The secondary data was used in the input-output DEA model to generate efficiency 
scores for each facility. The service utilisation data was used to determine productivity 
change and mean efficiency scores in the selected public health facilities over the study 
period whilst primary data was used to examine how fiscal decentralisation may have 
impacted on service utilisation, and perceived quality of care. 
The key sources of data and their detailed explanation are given below: 
I. The Ministry of Health workload report for health facilities. This gives a summary of 
services provided at the public health facilities. These services are classified as 
outpatients. inpatients. maternity. operations and other specific services. The services 
were aggregated into total outpatients and total inpatients. These were used <IS outputs 
in the computation of technical efficiency 
The Ministry of Health summary reports on authorized and actual personnel. The 
study considered only the actual personnel (medical and non-medical) at each of the 
facilities' sampled. These were used to deternline the ratio of medical to nOll-medical 
pt.'rsollnel and used along with other explanatory variables in the impact assessment 
or liscal decentralisation on technical efficiency. 
3. Government of Kenya Appropriation and other accounts. This provides inltH"lnation 
on recurrent expenditure. Total aggregate data on actual recurrent expcnditure was 
ohwincd rather than recurrent budget estimates. This was necessary becuust! of wide 
din:rgcnce between the budget estimates and the actual expendilun:. Actual 
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expenditure was used as input in the input-output DEA model for computing 
technical efficiency scores of the facilities. 
4. The cost recovery revenue collection reports. This information was obtaint:d from the 
facilities. The research instruments used for the field survey were de~igned fl)r structured 
questionnaire-based interviews. 2 for the patients and 1 for hospital staff (qut:stionnaire 1, 
2. and 3 in Appendix 2). The questionnaires were designed to elicit information on access 
factors. patients' perceived quality of care and revenue colJection and liSt:. Besides 
capturing information on quality of care and access factors, the staff questionnaire was 
also designed to obtain information on the factors affecting the effectiveness of fiscal 
decentralisation. their understanding of financial/fiscal decentralisation and suggestions 
for improvements. 
Six research assistants and a team leader were responsible for primary data collection. 
The six research assistants w~re first trained for two days on the questionnaire 
administration. Exit interviews were administered to outpatients as they Idt the health 
facilities atter receiving treatment. They were randomly sampled after the medical officer 
had seen them. 
The inpatient interviews were administered in the wards. The key infonnants li)1' the staff 
questionnaire were the district medical officers of health. matrons. nurses in charge of 
wards. hospital secretary. hospital accountants and revenue clerks. pharmilcists and 
clinical officers. The staff questionnaire was administered by one research assistant and 
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the team leader instead of letting the staff complete their own. The earlier plan to have 
the staff complete the questionnaire on their own was changed after a discussion was held 
with the medical officer of health in the first facility. They expressed conCl:fI1 that the 
staff may not forward the filled questionnaires on time. However, part of the staff 
questionnaire was given to senior staff to complete. 
The exercise received support from the Ministry of Health who wrote introduction letters 
to the distriCt medical officers of health detailing the rationale for the study and seeking 
their cooperation in the exercise. This made it relatively easy for the research team to 
obtain permission from the health facility managers to carry out intervicws in their 
facility. 
3.1.5 Time period of the study 
The data collection component of this study was conducted from 13lh Deccmht'r 1999 to 
10111 J:'lJluary :2000. The collection of both the primary data and secolldar~ data was 
carried t-lut concurrently. 'Interviews on average lasted for about between ]() millutes to 
01lL' hOllr. The research team commenced work at 9 am to 5 P.M. Howen:r. ill some 
facilities. the exercise did not start until 2 p.m. because the medical officer of health was 
not anlilablc to give consent to conduct interviews. This happened \vht'll the senior 
ofticcrs "ere involved in a district management board meeting. Interviews \\-cre only 
conducted on weekdays. 
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3.2 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
3.2.1 Training of research assistants 
In order to ensure reliability and validity of the interview instruments. a two-day training 
exercise was conducted for the research team. This was necessary in order to standardise 
the method used in the administration of the questionnaire. During the session. lluestions 
that \vere unclear were clarified and appropriate explanations given. In addition. each 
question was discussed for purposes of creating unifonnity in the administration of the 
questionnaire. Further. during the exercise. the team held a debriefing session after the 
data collection each day to report on possible problems of interpretations and aner which 
appropriate amendments were effected. Besides, each research assistant was n:llllired to 
write a summary report 'of personal observations and/or problems experiencL'd in the 
administration of the questionnaire. 
3.2.2 Ethical issues 
Among the ethical issues considered was the issue of administration 01' inpatient 
questionnaire. Those patients who were not in a position to respond to the qlll:stions were 
not inh:ryiewed. The research team relied on the nurse in charge of the specific ward to 
identify the patients who were not too sick. Before commencing the inter\'il:\\ process. 
inf{lI'Illl:d co'nsent was obtained from the patient. The patients were inrorml:d of the 
details of the study, their role and importance of their participation. Only :; patients 
rcfusl:J to participate in the exercise in the 4 facilities visited. The same procl:dure was 
applil:d to the outpatients and the staff. However. ~ue to fear of victimisation or staff by 
their seniors. the hospital secretary or the matron introduced the research tl:am to the 
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health personnel in the relevant departments. Final,ly, all the participants were assured of 
the confidentiality of the infonnation they provided. 
3.2.3 Data Analysis 
Hospital efficiency scores were generated using DEAP software for each health IllI:ility in 
tht." sample. In order to explain the causes of the differences in efficiency within a facility 
over the specified period, the study utilises regression analysis with efficiency scores as a 
dependent variable. This approach has been used by Fare el. al (1996). and Gerdtham et 
01..(1999). The estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on hospital efficiency in 
this study is based on the input-output linear programming model for the generation of 
dliciency scores and an econometric model (Censored Regression Tobit Model). 
The Tobit regression estimates should be interpreted as describing the probahility that a 
DT'v1U (a hospital) will be efficient. given infonnation about its olltput and input 
characteristics. The coefficients of a censored tobit model represents the dkct of a unit 
change ill the concerned explanatory variable on the probability of a hospital being found 
rdati\'dy etlicient or being restricted to zero and one (Scott 1997; Greene 1997: (jujarati 
19(5). For instance, the slope coefficient for medical staff is - 0.4955. This means that on 
U\'erage an increase in the total number of medical personnel by one would lead to a 
reduction in hospital's probability of being efficient (censored) by 49.6%. 
3.2..1 Data management and quality assurance 
As indicated earlier. the study team met after the interviews and all the questionnaires 
were scrutinized to verify that all the responses were correctly entered and to check for 
48 
consistency. Where inconsistency was noted, it was rectified. In extreme cases, the 
particular questionnaire was discarded. The field data was entered into Excel by a data 
entry clerk. The secondary data was entered into Excel and then transferred into STATA 
statistical package. All the data was cleaned by checking for outliers or ineligible data. 
3.2.5 Study limitations 
Several problems were experienced in the collection of data. Firstly, it was nol possible to 
obtain complete actual recurrent expenditure and utilisation data for some ycars due to 
poor record keeping and the unavailability of data for some facilities. Utilisation data and 
revenue generated is collected on monthly basis, but most facilities did not have complete 
data for the 12-month period. The data had therefore to be extrapolated from the available 
data obtained from the MoH summary reports on .authorised and actual personncl while 
that of revenue collected extrapolated from the health care financing division monthly 
re\'enue reports. In some cases only the proyincial data on cost sharing rc\'cnue were 
a\'ailable. rather than district utilisation or revenue. Those facilities. which did not have '. . 
data. were excluded in the final study sample. In addition, some facility managers and 
hospital secretaries tended to conceal some information, especially information related to 
user fees. 
The plan \\'as to interview 200 patients and 80 health personnel from the selected 
facilities. This was however not possible because of delays in getting permission li'om the 
Ministry of Health Headquarters and the district medical officer (DMOH) i 11 sOl1le of the 
facilities to enable us conduct interviews on time. This meant that thc cxercise 
cOlllmenced ,behind sche~ule. Second. a numb~r of health personnel did not complete the 
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questionnaire where these were left with a request to complete them. as thl:)' were not 
available to be interviewed on the facility data collection days. Despite repeated visits to 
the facility to get the que~tionnaire, some ofth~m had completed 
Lastly. it was not possible to meet members of the district health management hoard to 
provide tirst hand infonnation about the perfonnance of the board and its effectiveness in 
carrying out its responsibilities. 
Notwithstanding these constraints. the quality of data was not compromised. A !lumber of 
strategies were adopted to address the above constraints. For example inskad of first 
\'isiting the facility at the.time of the interview. the team leader visited the hlCility on the 
day hcfim: day of the actual data collection to obtain pennission from thl: facility 
manager. This improved the time required for data collection. 
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction. 
This section presents the descriptive and analytical findings of the study. The analysis 
involves an examination of the survey data to highlight the impact of tinancial 
management of cost sharing revenue on hospital performance. As noted earlier, by 
decentralizing financial management and expenditure decisions, it was expected that 
facilities would improve efficiency in health services delivery. increase revenue 
collection and patient satisfaction. This section provides an analysis of the extent to 
which these objectives have been realised, using qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Ideally. in order to measure the success of the decentralisation of decision making of cost 
sharing revenue expenditure in achieving the stated objectives, it was necessary to assess 
the trends in technical efficiency as well as a patient survey of their perceived quality of 
service. In audition. a staff survey tailored to measure the changes in the quality of health 
care sen'ices among other objectives was also undertaken. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows: 
Section 4.2 provides an overview of utilisation and revenue trends tor the sampled 
facilities lor the years 1994. 1995. 1997 and 1998. Survey results, highlighting efficiency 
(albeit indirectly) and quality of health services is presented in section 4.3. SeLlion 4.4 
presents efficiency scores for each of the MOH facilities in the sample 1(.11" the period 
specified. Ernpirical results based on regression analysis of the impact of decentralized 
financial management of cost sharing revenue and other determinants is provided in 
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\\ .!lung tlln~ IS ~ri!icol in dClemlllllng palient 's choice of health care pro, idl'r.' (Mwnbu 
(" ,,/1'J'lJ5: Iklmum and Kutzln 19<)3: Gllson ~11I/199.:1) The drl"(;l 0[1111> m,,~ h,"'cvcr. 
1,lf' I" lIIJllidual pallen(~ charaClcmucs. Walling lime carnes dltlcn:111 kIds of 
",lI!lI\g 11m,' Rc'von(hng 10 the qU(:,jlon on waiting lillle. 35% of OUlP;lIi""II' .",oJ .1::!"·. of 
1I!!,.'lICIl\~ J,,,I:;cd Iht: wOl ling lim.:" to b.: short Another .1)0 .• o f DUlpalicl1l, "ull 50% of 
InIMh"IlI' (c"nsldered walling tIme to be ovel':lllc ..... 'h,le another 11.:>" . ,lIul 14% 01 
"lIll'''lklll~ ~IIJ Inp:uienl~ respec!\\'el~ feli lhal Ihe Walllll!! lime was (il(l Inng. lunher. Jl 
II Lc' 1';11 "'111-. \\ 1111 thl' IlUlIOnl) nOllng Ihal ll~ contact unit' \\3.5 ad<'qwlc 
" 
-1.2.4 , '"I ienlS' punptilln y bllut t1~tor'sJnllru' I hYntll inll. of thdr I'cubkllh 
The \\:11 II", nurse or the OOtlOr handles the p;lhems' rna) inOucnce Ihc:ir J'I.>f'1:epunns 
aboul the 'luallty (}f~flICCS (Ramum t'l 1111993. R.:moJall CI 01 1990; (;ilson "/ ,,/ 1994). 
This SluoJ~ 50ughl 10 delennUIe the rauenls' pcrcepuoo about the nu~ ~nd;nr <IOt:1Of$' 
cofll,;em ,INUI Ihe pt l(l ,'fILf f~ehngs, The respondents "erc asled "hClhcl 111\:~ "'en: 
c"mlonJblc "Ith Ihe langu:'I!C used The majoril) (SO.8".) ann"cfI:d in th ... "ITouRalne 
"hlle IS". Ind lcaled Ihat Ihe) ... C~ Hot cornfonable On!) ," .. ofllle resp"mknh f~11ed 10 
R:SJX'rtoJ 10 Ih is queshon Asked "hC1her the)' "ould hale preferred anolh~r 1;lngIlaSc. 
7') 5".", Ihe Inp.IIICntS IIldltatcd Ihal Ihe) had no problem "'!lh the IJllllUll~l' u .... ,J "hdst 
.. nl} 1'1 ~ •• of the J'<'henIS pn:ferred nnOlhe, bngUllge About 62,So .• ~noJ ~~ ''";.of lhe 
l':'I, .. nl~ n:p .. rl<.:tllhal the nu~~ Of tlnctur.; Ilere able IU dlagnuse lhel r pruhlclll .llltl 'or the 
illn.:s, \Il(lther SS 9",. saId Ih;u lheir problems "ere well addressed. The /"'I"'"SCS arc 
1''''' uk'" 11\ hllie .&.2 bcloll 
I ~ hi,' '& ,2 ]'al ien 1$ ' I'~ ceCpl lOll "ll<Iul tlo(\or 'slnu rse 's hn ntl ling or Iltdr ".-. ,hll'lIl~ 
Rfipmlla /JwWI)' ",o~, IfjtlgntJSG ·f ED<,<I/o-,· ''''1111/1''1: "f 
ulldtfl/unJilt/: of 'h~ pildofl's '''~ I"'titllf'~ "", .. ,I/'S 1'",lI/tIItS UIIlt:U!sr!!!l!.'_ "NII>J~II(' 
t-umMf ""- t-unlbc:f ""~M l\uUI""r I't:r cent Vrr, ... ~II " 20.6 10 25.6 " IH \\dl " 62.1 " 5U " " 0 111) l'~rll~ '" 12.8 " 15.4 '" ~~A I Nul "I ~ II ; 18 , ' .2 , " T"t~ 1 " "" " 100 -, 100 
fl.·"",,~oJ Lhol tI",~ were salisfied "ilh Ihe scn'lces prm Itled "hlle 6211-0 ,m,) (, ~",. of 
1111'111,'111' nnd oUlpallentS rc:,PCCIII'c!Y indicmed thaI lhcy "c~ 1101 salls'i~.,J 'h~ 1'1:;150115 
,'"Ip.lIl~IIl' .md 66.~'O ofmp;!tienlsj such lIS hosplI~llmc ll and beds. \lllI~h I,,·re ""led 10 
" 
be inadequale ~nd in a deplorahle Slate About 12~. of mp:memslloo ~ ·, •• II "ut("atlems 
IloUt;;xJ Ihlu I he alliludu and actions of providers of cllte (health penGnnel) ~'(lntnhuted 10 
Ih.: d~h!roornllOn of care. Onl) one mdividual tlied lack of specialized 11\:.'lm~nt as a 
eatl!;C Io)/' d,ssatlsfactlOn (r.ce Table..j )) TIK- survc), find on!:S !'Conforee ,II(' 111,,,1 IIl1(X1nam 
poll1l !1i;11 perceived quahl~ ofhospilu l SC'rviccs was undermined b} IllC'~ "I chll!;~ This 
rinllllll! "pcc'S "llh 11K- reported 10\\ 0\ ffilll qual il} of care nOled eat! ieT 
I ltll<l~ a~d db."urlrou, S,. rr 
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~ .!. h 1· ..... ·'· [11 111 11 < of" hel her rc' cn uc colh.'c lfil is adtq ualc!) ufilis ..... 
dl~,rql~n~~ hlrtl'll.'r discussion \Iith IhI! medical Officl!rS revcalcd Ihal 11'11.' Jllli:«:nce 
I\:suh~ a~ .1 rc'>uh of the amount Ihal is USL .... 10 mc'CI emt.'fllcncltS, I h,' ,u~l)" could 
" 
"-a> pUI 10 lhe: n'SpondCllIS lu discuss op:nly lhe lhUlp lhal Ih~ adminiSlrlllh'l1 should do 
\U Impru\c ho."I!.hh can- deli"crl, lb: maJoril) of lhe pallenlS (71 SQ. of 1II[1,ll1cl1lS an.! 
51". of QUlpallc:nIS) oolC'd lhallhe hospual managcmt'nl should ensure r"'j,'lll.lr ~lIrp1) of 
dn.:p . ..:mplo) nlOfl: stan, 10.3'. of lnpallrnts and 10",. of oUlpaliC1l1S). \lhlh; ci'lI1Hlalion 
01 ,,>n1l1'1I0n":tlo alio,demifird as an Importanl fa<"IOf in 
FiglSe 7: S. gges'ialS for I~rg Health care CRl ivery 
20 
cO " 0 ~ CJ 
Ildqae ,~ """"" -.. """", """ """. ,.. """'. ."... """"" """ ~, 
h ,~.k'l! Ih'\\I II,., fij,\ure lI\al an adcqU3le suppl} 01 drua;s IS lhl: moSt (rllic.,1 1.lelUr in 
1 h" ~I . .tl t>1.'n'c,ulhe nmnag.cmcnt and mc,'mpch:nl cle.ks for 11Ie: shonn!:..: I hh "Ul'f'Orts 
..:11 ... ,\1\ c' plan \\Illf COnlrlbUI<'S 1,1 Ihe shona~~s. Th ... 5\3ff \ leWS (see !;CCli"ll J \ I ,,,:cd 10 
bo: In;Jlc-J "lIh CJUlioll because our discussIOn ... nh tho: dlslrlct mal,cal ~'Ili.-.'''' "I hcalth 
proou.t-J conOI;;unl! infonn311on from t~ e1{JI'~ h} lhe staff and Ih" I\JI'c'UI~ Th,s 
IS m\c.li~lt'd funhcr in S('clion -I 3 
A "IUo.!"'HIl "as JlUI \0 the T"spondenls soltcitml> their \ I"" S aholll lhe C{)!;I fli h,'"llh C3T<.' 
Sl:n ICC, It . hould not be forgollen Ih3t Ih" COSI or carl: I~ on" of the hICh'" IlIlIdctlllg 
(\I:n'" It> he311h sen 'ices (B:.mum and KUIl~in 1993. Gilson I:/tJll994). n..,....,lI "II rigur" 
III/MII,'Itt> 3nd ~ .• of oUlpatu.'ms) "hi .... anolhl:t I] 5% of mpallcnh ,11101 I~·. of 
OUlpJIICnls nokd thai the COSI .... ';IS no! t'XpcrtSI\'t' til III! 
Fi~u r,' II: I ':.t l; ~ nb I'Herrhlln lIn , he ,' .. ~I uf ,,:lTr 
.1..1 1~t:SUI.TS OF THE ST Aft' SURVEY 
J. ,l .1 Rt"cnllt ~ull~~ l ill n li nd II~'" 
Opn1l0n~ uf lhe medicol perwnnel PI lhe health faci lilics in rellilton I.) lilt: un",'ll't olf 
d~'~"'11Ir;J!I~~-d lin"nc,~1 mnnn~eml:nt (If C05t shann!; r ... \Cnw I~ Imp.>r1"nt III ""~"S.'iI11i: 
"helher the I'TOo;r;ullmc I) ochlc' In!; the .Ialtd obJecti\·cs. As noted In III<: In.:,.I1U1"'. lhe 
suo.:u,,"' n. Ihe rd.mn sl rnl~l:) r~"l\llrc. mlormed and suslamed ~ommlllllcni 1"'111 ,I .. , slalT 
rt">f",n"l1k A 10wl of 57 h ... ahh personnel consisting o f 32 (56%) female. ;111.1 ~~ IJ-I",1 
mak, IIIl" l l'f\\oom had I'roflossion:d tr:llnmt:. were mtcf\'ic"ed 
J .. ' .l " nl>" ledge or Ihe Ilh JC( li\ t~ or fi n:", ... i~1 d«rnlnIiU l;on 
01 Ihe 57 Man nnc,",le<o\ed (t1w'sc coml'flscd of t..e~ Informants: heads "I dq'"rllllenlS. 
hl"Pll,,1 ..... .;r.:1Jflcs. hospnal 1IC<:0llnUlnI. Ih .. · ch lel nursln\; omc"'~ ortJ Ito .. ' Illcdll:al 
om.: ... ,", tIf hcallh) on o\ef\\hdmml/ majorilY. 55 lor 96.5"_) \Il· .... ~".'f\. I,j ItlC 
J.· .. · .. ·l11f.IIo,. 'l"m nfCl)S1 ~3rl1llll,·\cnu.: .''<prOO,lurc Onl} :" (nmonnllnl' t .. '~""I ,,~ .... 
10.'1 , ... m,· "I the r"fonn pro~rantllt'· FuJ1hcr. in I'Csponse W lhe questiol1 ,"I .. hl,·,II\CS of 
II,,' 1.-(,'1111. the most commonl~ Slll,ed obj«li\cs "'1:I'C 10 Lmpro\C h""I'II;11 ,Cr\ICCS 
(~, h" . I. h' stlppl" mcnl gOVCnlmClll revenue (12)'1'_). and impro\'c ho.hl'".,1 dlic l elK"~ 
, ;, ~~,,). ,,1111.· ~ I" ~ did nOl hat C 1111) !dl.":l of 1m- obJ~li\ es 
~ .I .. ' Ik;,hh r"tiht its' IIbi l i '~ In mnl tit.' la rl!cts 
In ~""~I": III lh ... '111t'5110n on .... h.:lher the fac,lilil'~ hlld mel re\ellue co!l~~II"11 1;111,:"(>. it 
".h 1.·,,·,,1.-.1 Ihal all lhe facililles IITC' r~'Qult<"<l 10 SCI ltlelf o" n rC\,'IIIOI 1,",c,'I" The 
t.lull\l~'" perl/mned ht-Iow I!Xpect.ll10ns and onl} 7'h were found to h.!\!.' r'-,III .... o.J their 
tall!et~ ()! tho!\(' cl:lllnmg trut the fndlnies had not met the tarllcts set. nh.'111 thrL"C 
t ~ .1" 0 •. I,,", 511llCl""lsor) 'ISlts and Inlrequcnl meetIngs b)' Ihe district he:. Ilh nl.II~ll!ement 
boord. IS ~·.I alllolll1 other reasons Th.: responses are presellled III Table 4 41",1"" 
M,,-,_ ... ,- --t~ •• '" ....... 1............-.1 n '" 
11'1" -toll _'IIIC<"'''' ; " 
........... " ... _ ... 1l11\!lI. ; " 
I ... " 
, " 
1""'1"""'''''' , ...... J..., ...... "'1''' ... ..., .~ ... "" , '" 





10 •• 1 ,- 1,., 
-I .,lA III fllnnw lio n on blinking or tilt rr\ rnut CoUt'(Il"tl 
11;".:.1 "" the ~ur .. e~ resuhs. ~~ (77,70/0) out 01 Ih,' 57 hcahh personn..! III'':f'Iewed 
111>1",;,111:.1 tiM! the r(lelllle collected ~hould be b.1n~cd the samt d.al. the 1,,11""11111 da) 
felt that nut 1111 the IC\CIlUl: collected ... -as banked cited the rolJoWtn~ ~a."'Il' ,/'Cootng 
befon: b;on~ tnl! (40,4·.). the ft of funds (330/.). spendmg without aUlhont) (.,..) ~!lU frnoo 
(I SO.I Thl- rest fl7.S·· .. 1 did 1101 h.l\"~ an lI!ea of thc cause oftk dtscrep;ln(., I h .. ,,,,, "ho 
clJun..-d to h;l\e no cxpllmiluOI\ UI this regan! were rdUCI:un 10 di\'ulj;e tnt"nn.llnm for 
kar ul "ll "ll1!>allun b~ the-IT 5CTlh'n.. a fae l that rcllliorces the- SUT"\ C) lindllll!' th.lt lax,t> 
111 Iin.lnn.1I m~1I3gell\e-llt and ~"l11r .. 1 b~ the m:lI1agenal stall ntB} be ~unlflb"h"g h. the 
OI>,Cfh,j 'Jnation 
\\ hen .,I~h-d Ihc drcwnstances under Ilhich the revenue cOIle-C1ro could he 'I'<'"t hefore 
I>.m~m!,: .• 1.6% citro em<.'rgellQ ca~e~. purchllS<' of druGS (35'1'.). for tr.,l"'1>1'1'1 .... lfPOsc~ 
1111"0). ur other reasoliS (63 :~ol. fix- cale~OI") 'other' refers 10 exJIClidittn .... ,uch as 
"11'>\:1'1 l~n~OlI' Itcrns e I!- StaIlOna~. pamlllll! the w:lll1ng rooms. mamtenallCt "I huildmgs 
~I1J ,,11 I"./d for Inpah~nts. /\$ nOled cather. 950/. ortlle fClcn\X" collC"l:too j, '''I'1'k>sed 10 
h,: l!.m~~J "Iule 5°/. is n: tatned h) meet emergellcy purchases of dm.:..' "I r,lo1d for 
p..l1l(IH~ Th.:rcfore. some of tli.: Ie-awns ~"en do not p!1l"ldt sulrlClC~1! ~wunJ~ for 
'r\o,."IIJ"l~ tht: 1"l.""lelllK" befolc b.:ml.ill);. or r"Il,)wing propt.'r pfllCedllTc" ("I .<1'1''''\1111: 
~'I"'·II.lIll1r~ ,,1.Uls 
~ .. 1."' \\ hu , huu III he 111 ' ul. \'0,1 III p I" nil jil l( ~ IllI m'l n"I("m"n! ur n" ,'n II,' r" " ... 1 ~ 
I" ~Jln mUTe lIl,ij!h( inti' \lhcthtr plilllmnj! ~l1d management of le ... ·III"· ... ,Ik"\.·to:! 15 
dk~h,.:h ~JrTi.:d \lUI. II IS helpful t,I .. 'xamml" ,,110 sh<.,u ld be Itl\lol\~,t In pl.II111111;; and 
m.uu;; .. ·nWIlI ulthe revenue generated. A general question \IDS PUllO Ih~ 1""I~",d~l1t~ IU 
,,,h. II th<:lr Hews on \100 should be lI1\"ol"ed 111 thi: nlllna~em ... nt 01 th~ 1~\Cl\ue 
.. 
(35 I· .). D1IMT, (28.1·,.). pn)\II1Ci91 medical ()lTicer or health (17.5"0) .mJ DII\IBs 
(158".) II) thm order lM:e ftl:ur~ 9) Currently. the process of Ilppl'Ovinl: lhe \lb Jus 10 
PJS~ lhr"u~h thrte Still1es: fi r;1 appro,al of proposals from ~ahh f...:thllc ... h~ t.ht 
DlIMT". second. appro\al b} ,he pro\tlleia) m.:du:al omc~t of health . . !l1d Iin.lIl~ the-
do Ill'l !la, ~ lull cootrol OH'r thc l1:\enuC' This is maml) becauSe' lhe mnne~ j, hanlcd Bt 
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Infurm:uoon on 00\\ tho.' r~\enu~ collt'Ct~ IS ulihsed b} a fatllily is omportant on J_~nl! 
oospitul emcienc~ III resourte use and quality aspects of the health 5('rlie..·~ rr,wided 
J fllco ~nt uti Ii"llllon of Iix' revenue generatoo Will be enhancca if Ihe h<.-;Ilth p..·1 ",nnd arc 
In' Jr,' "I' ho\\ I~ rel'enue should be used. It is Illen'fore a mallet ul ",,"_I,lembic 
'U1f'<lrl~'IC~ 111;11. tho.' SI;lIT~re ~";\TC ofh<)\\ L1 should be is spt'l1t. It is cllCouraC:lIlt: 10 nole 
lh~L lll.- lll.lJUrily of the I'I:spolld~nlS (7~'.) "~n' a""MC of 00" the r~\CI1Ll~ g~l1crruod 
~h"ul,J 1>0: spo.:nt. About II So 0 of I~ r~sporl(knIS \Ie ..... nul nwa ...... \\ hiisl I Ii,' I ,11I.IIlIlIlg did 
flOt r~,f'<'n.J to llus q UoCSlion. 
\"L • .J 11\'" 11-,., Tt!Il'IIUC n:l;L1n~U shoulJ I>c useu. lhe follo\\101l usc~ \\crc Idcluificd. 
purdu....: III drugs 03 7'0). bu~lOg l'IIu1pmcnt (7" .• ), bulidlOg m:um,'n:lI1n' I ~ 1° oj and 
'".1.:( ,-1° 01, The cnleGO~ of ·ull>o...,.· lnchxks cxpo:lldill,ll\'S 011 st.111''''''r, lurlOll of 
l,,,u •• k ...:cunt~ gual\b and !fanspolU\lOII h 1$ '" IdCIIl lhal, the I'I:I'cnu~ r,l''''''''' I' used 10 
J>T'''hWIl ,'1' '''lllC scn,ees "hleh lho: Ilm'enUl1Cnl IS c"pL'ctcd to f'l'u,'tk Ihc COSl 
,h.ll'm:,: 1~''''lU': I~ m~anl 10 SUflrlt:m~t lho- ~o'cmmC111 In the- pUfeh .. "" ... ,( '·" .... ·rt'alC) 
,JI\I~~ .Iml I,ll IIlIp!'O'Cntl"nt of Ih~ fac,lllln, an,J nUL ~, " thc ~3'~_ ,""UII1,' ,I "Il!~"" 
""1" "hill' I ,I ~ I II flT\}\ idlll~ -.en ices. 
Ll. ~ I II1dt'm'~ of d'~ l ricl I r\'~' II T) III p rocl"" i ll l: ~ '" im, 
1",.,,,,,.11 ,J .. '(~"lr;dl~a\lOIl m.1l nOl .!Chlnc lhe stn lcd ohjcctl\'es ifll>o..'I\'\C11I1o.' ;!"ICTlII~-d 
I' ,,,'1 tI\ .• ".,~,,'J cfliciemly 'I hl' disl TlCl Ireasury is 11\ chart'~ or finan da 1 mf, ITII]'III"" and 
111 .• 11 .• ;:.:111,'1\1 "I' lin.melDI lmn..aCllons. Respondi ng 10 Ih, .. o.ju,·sllOn on tl .... .-11 ..... ,:\1\ "'IIC\~ of 
" 
thr distriCl lreasur) In performing tts SlD t~-d functionS. 43 people 175-1".1 '''II"dered 
tl\<as\l~ to be: ineflicient ill proces~ing hospilal claims. Of ( ho~e claimjn~ II\;u district 
lrea5m~ had not perfonned liS dut) eITklcnll). 35% ;d~nt ined delays in ;!C'llllll,: AII~ 
jQ"" dcla~ S In reicasing funds. :!o" diversion of funds ~d 2% lack of 3CCnlll1l"bll, I> (SI..'e 
lil,!lIl\: 1ll 1>..:10\\ I 
Fi):11 rc I II ; l'crfonnallCl' uf d i~ 1 ricl I rras u I)' 
" 
! " " • ! , 
'.'" 
A, Illl.'>1iWlIl.'d l:arhcr, one of the ~~ons for dC\:Clltrallsahun o f fimrnclul 1lt.l!hll,!,'mCIl1 is 
hI J.1l, '" Ihl.' ho~pilal managers meet some of the recum:nl expendilures C.I,! lII"uHenance 
ot \ ch,,:[,,, find purchase of other cssenllal inputs Of the 101al stan" inlet> "'",:d, 70% 
md,cal,...! thaI mO~1 of the vehicles were not in good "Orkln8 condition "Iuk "nl~ 28% 
!>."d Ih,1l til<; \'ehides "ere opemling, Through obS<!r\'~lLon. II \\as rnl.',' l,:.t (1);,1 Ihe 
"'.'I"ru~ "I' Ih" he~lth f~c,IIII"" h~d old "eh,cles mDl>l 0 f "hieh had b~"'n 1"" ,,,,,,kJ Lnek 
,,!, ,,'l'\lce. hlJ:!h urem1ing alld maml.:n3flCe COSI coupll-d "ith dl\'el'!>lUll "I lumls wa, 
ell,'.! ,h Jhl.' re~>on for non-opcrauonal • .:hiclt'S. As a rocull of non·op,:,,,u,,n.,\ \ehiclc~. 
m",1 "I Ihe lucd l1 les In the sampl(' "ere n01 In U PCSl11011 10 cult)' OUl '11[l~I\'Mun of 
prllll.tl'~ ,1111.1 pre\ cnll~e health care ~C\i\'l t IL"', or <.Ilslnbult drugs ami "Ihc' "'e<.l,cal 
sllJ1PIo~, 'II Iml': 
.. 
..I .J .'1 \\ h .. h.' r g.w~rn menl hullgcl a II [}':"I ;II II III h ,,~ piT.lII.' h: ... hUn red u ~.·d 
As noted earlier. conlmued fundmg of heallh facil itic-s b}· the government is ~'sS<'llljal for 
the ul-lccUlcS of financial d,'eenlrahs31;on 10 be realized. Has g,,\·crnmcnt n:duccd 
Imd),'ci allocallo[}s as a result uf If'" W~l sroring revenue bemg rcU!m,"tI 1» Ih~ I.,~ IliJics~ 
Ahuul 70". of the staff inter,i'·lled responded inlne affirmative, another ~..I.h". did nOI 
acr~c II hik the rcmaimng did 001 respond 10 this qu.:stion Examination 11, Ih,· quarterly 
Tt.'Curr.:nl c~pcndilurc allocations n:vealed thaI. most healtll facilities n.":I·1I ~ h,'lween 
J..:.11 ,'11.000 to Ksil. 800.000. Tllis allocallon is hardl} adequ,1 te for Ihe :>o.:ler.,1 "'TVlees 
tll.H Ill<" n1l'dieal onieer of bcahh has 10 meel for the entire district. 111dc~d. "'Ille sub-
J"" I~I h'''1''131$ rect';l"cd largt'r hudgt'l allocations limn the diSlricl hospllah I he ligure 
hl~hh~hls and confirms dlspantlcs in thc allocation among fael hli.:s . Il11I' . .lhhough 
c\I'~'ldlHlI\: allo.:allon was hlJ:iher in J997-9g period. there are d'scr"paIH:IC' :lmo!l J:i 
l'l<.·ihll\·~ 
\., 11\'TeJ earher. most of Ihe fa~rriues cxpcnenw aeutc shortag!.' of dru~~ \\ '1"·11 ;ls~ed 
I<'t a" "1'"1"'11 011 duralJoll t:,) .. CIl to reslocl lhe dru1!s. Ihc following re'I"~I"'" "ere 
.onl"'I"'.! 1<'> persons OUI of 5 7 lor 33.3% I s.lId one week. 16 persons (18. I ~"l 1> .. ·h,,\ c lilat 
" I.,~e, ."Ie momlL "hile 31l0Ther 20 (J5.1~.) said 0"'1 a momh NOII\III"""',hng lhe 
\~n~I,"n, III th<' responses. one thm" IS clear. Ihal Ihere are delays in Ilt<>,·,,,,·men( of 
tlru~, ,,,rJ I>o:rhap'. 11ti~ e~pl;lins Ih,' bel of drugs rcport~d in most of the he,,11 Ii I.,cd ities. 
I h~ '<·.1"'11, adl'anced for l'",bkl11s rclallng 10 drul! sUl'p ly and us..· \\cn: I"~'r stock 
m.IIL!~"·Ill<."1T\ I ttl .~',.). p"x:urcm~n\ prol-kms i 19 .Jo,.,. Jdays III dismr.u(,,," "" hill Ihe 
Ixllll~ "'01. nnd Inadequatc lund,nl:' (g go .• ). Furtllcr. II was fCl"eak·d 11m I"~'r slock 
mana1;cmellt I) taused ~ th<' mJlla!!em~:nt"s failure IU cdmply wilh Ih,' dql.lrlmt'nllli 
rC<.tl.J('>lS ami unsla lkd ckrks In chargt of pharmaclcs. The staff thcm -...:he~ halt 
mUlilalcd that the situation has dtttnoratcd !;inct the lime" ht'n th~ !;Ovemllle~ II "'" full~ 
fundilli! the dchl tr) ofh~aJth can> stl'\ ICtS. 
-I . .l. 11I "I :Iff Ilcrt'~pl ion II bout th .. q U~ lil~ of U I"' i«. 
The nlJJlInl~ 166 7·.j of heallh personnel rq:tOn..-d that tht Si;1'\1C'" h.kl tlthtr 
d~1t:mlrJlcJ or nOI IInrn"L-d ~I all Ho"t\tr. -I20f. of Iht staff indlcah . .J lhat the 
1lI~lIlh:Il;III~" uf buddin!;s Iud ll11prOH-d. ahhoul1h al the c"pe~ or , ........ ·,,".11 ..... ,..,IC\"$ 
sud, 'l' dmll~. labol"atol;- rC3IlL'1\!). hc.-d and hM"l1 111110nl1 othcTs SnlllJlllh '1.011" morale 
"a~ rep'.,t"d III be vel) 10\\ IllIh 4'1" . Cllln~ Ih is response Thtst' fi ndllll1 ' L.III1.·ur wllh 
Ihe lie"" nprcssed b) th<: palltnls. Based on Ihm R\'(' lulions. It ,~ 'h .te".>nh~ 10 
tnCIItIl 'n thai. on 3\erag .... th ... qualit) of st'r"I'ICCS has dtimorllltd \"nll.lr~ 10 Ihc-
" 
J _J \1 F..ASI IIU: I\'lFII.'T OF 1I0SI' ITAL FFFIrIENC \' : IlI: A RF~"III.T" 
~.J . I Inlrmlucl;on 
1 hIS S,"'1I0n pTt:'S/'1l1S Ihe DEA i:'ffici~nc~ resu lts for the spttlficd pcruJd Thl, is then 
1OIIOI"-'d h~ ref!rl.·ssIOn a nalpis 10 IIS~SS IItt: Impacl of fiscal dttemraHs;III"n :111..1 OIher 
~ . J. 2 Th,' 1110,\ mool",1 
IIlIlrJ~r 10 c arr:- OUI II DEA as.sCSSnJl'nt, it is necessary to construct an I11pUI <CI tIl reneet 
c"'T~,p<mdinl! milpuis Ihe>' secure. T\\"o Illputs were used namdy; rt"t:llm.'lll '"'I'.:ndimre 
,old mllll!>.:1 of heds (a pro~y for Ihc size of Ihe facilil ies and Thei r capllal ,II,d.); and 
Jdl,,·n~,. I~mll) planning. and denial clinic). inrall~nl admissions .HlJ .;,"1 1~"O\er:-
1',11,,, II I' "onh men1l01l1ll1! that lhe health personnel lin: financed hy th.: central 
I!",,"rn!n~m ~nd the~ constitute' pari of Ihe recurrent e~pendi t uTt:' in Ih~ 31-.,"" Input scI 
111<'''' " 110' r,'J,;On Ihcrcfore. as 10 "hy .111 Ihe r,'source, "hould 1101 he ll.·d,,"·,~1 to Ihe 
'm~k 111 1' (11 "I \olal TeClifrenl expenditure 
II", .,to,\ll' ,npuh :Ind oulpUIS .... cn' used 10 modd ho.,pllal services ;l;; II nUIIt,-onput and 
11,,,111-0 'III pUI pl'l>Jucllon proc,,%, In addll101l. Ih" u,~umpllon of 1'9nlbk 1'I.'!Ilflh I,. , .. ;1k ,~ 
1,'n"l>l" Ii" lh~ all()\'e Input-oulput ,uriabks' ThIs stud) n:pons lechl1l~JI <:Ili~i~llci~s 
J I", ,,,,,u"ln,,,,, of CRS ;. apprOJl""!< "I><n all II>< 00"","" .... o)lO",,,n& a! an opImul "e "h; Ilm.'.~r. 
I .... 'I''' '''''h a, f,nallCial con.",,,n". oon""""" brOllgJ\1 b>' hoallh s«IOI ",f",rn~ quahl) '''',,', 1"''''''1''. 
,n", "':O~~" h".p",1 "'" 10 0j><'f1I1. II ,I>< """,,n .. 1 ,,",I. Th. U'>C of In.. CRS .. ,umpl'o" .... 110" ",,' .. 11 Itt. 
iIl»I'".,I, '''~ '"","","~ allh. opl"",,1 KIll< w\llI""OO"". df"".IIC~ mea'u ......... hICh .r. cn"I.",,,J,"t) by 
ulld~r VRS 3..'isumpnon. The resuits \\~r~ computed using TIM Coell DE i-\P Ve·r:,ion 2.1 
sotl"ar~ and basL>d on Ihe input oriented DEA model produce measun: "I h;~hllical 
dli~I~Il<.) I'M c:Jch health facilit} sampled 
T"hk~':; I)is tribution ofTc(hniul Efficicnq' S.:ures 
III~~ CR~ VRS SCALE 1'l'I5 m ,"' ~( ALf 
~u,," .. 39 Eff":,,tfIC) I lIic .. ",,) 
"Iun '" ". " " O.J~ (0 {, , 01 11 ~1;",d."J orrt>l {1.~1 (l ~8 01 8 " " .~ 0'" II I I MIn.",,,m "" "" 0.~7 0.14 O~I I, ;7 Ma,,,,, .. ,,, I I I , 






1997 m VltS SCALE ,~. C"' \' It" ...... Al.E 
fib' ... ,.. ,II"",, " ElI1e,enq Ill;"",,,,,) 
Mc~n OH "" ." O~~ 0"1 01 73 ~1."d"J "" lJ' 0_~5 028 ." 0_~2 O~~ II 18 
~I",,,""n' o I~ ." ." ." 01" II 1~ 
~IJ""'"'" I 
, I I , 
fI'''p".,I_ 'm r, .. ,,,,, , , , , • 
\I nil " _clIre of less Ihan 1 af<: Il',hnic:JllI1cfficlcm. In IQ94. q out of ~') 1,lelilll," 111 th<o 
,.,ml'k ,,,,t~ eUiclelll compared h' 10 ,n 1995 0 7 and 8 111 1997 am! I'I'IX '" 110,,1 lO,der. 
1;.tt1!!~ 1""ln:; VRS assumption) from 17 \f) 100 per o:en! for 199J and '17 h' JIIII pt:r cenl 
h>r I')I)~ '''Ih an a,crag\' of 46 and 63 per ecm for 1994 and 1995 rc'Spo:<.IIH'h (Table 
i' 
,Ut. Tht' mcan oftechnic~1 cllk,c[\C) scores of the sample for 1997 ~l1d 1'1<1;': 1~ 55 and 
5H per ~cnl respectivel}, .... ilh ~ 10\\ of 19 per cenl fOT liJq7 and 1 ~ per C~1lI 1",' 1'1')8 lind 
lllu!;h "I' 100 per celli for bolh 1997 and 191)8 
1111.' diJln('llct III the conSlan! T\!tums to !.(Oal" (CRSI300 \'lIrlahlc relurns [('\ '<C"k (VRS) 
t"ch",,,,, 1 dficlcncy scores IIKhc~IC5 th~t th" hosp,tals h~\c scale mtmcicl1c~ [;Ibk -1,5 
,IoQ'\s Ihal Ihl' a"'r~!;!c sca lc "meienc), Qflhe Slimpii' range from 77 per eCltl I",. 1'19-110 
71 I'<.'r n'nl fur 1995 wi lh II 10\\ of 36 per el7l1 and II hIgh of 100 per celli, rh" ind,C llles 
111,,1 ",nk.' of lit" l)()sp n ~ls are 1101 opcr.lImg q uile clv~c 10 oplimal SCllil', 
I nnlo," th~sc resulls do 1101 I'<.'\tal II dtSCl'fml:llc paltem althou!:h Ih~r'" h", ll<:en II 
Ic"II",1<. ~ I"T n ~ignlfiCDnl pl1.Jportlon of the facihue. 10 ex ptnencc a down" ,II d trcnd in 
1"',I.,n,,;,,'\o;" 1\clcnhdcss, SOIllC facllilles have reglslered somc mlpnnCIllC"lllS in 
dli<l,'n~! Ic'cls, aJheil.gen"rall~ II SIn,,11 impll)l'cmenl. Ho"""'cr. dcspill'lnll'r(l'Cment5 
III r .. ·,.!"nn,lIlC\: 111 most of the fac,lities '11 1998. th~' o"C"rall mean emcicn~')'lIn n.·lnnills 
1,1\, ':(llllp,lt~d 1\, IIlJI or I<W-I :md 1995 Th" leasl cllicicm hospilal in I')"J-' . I'I')~. 1997 
.md 1'1'114 h;" ~n o\emll emcienc) scon' oro 171. O,::!I::!. 0.193 and O::!~'I Il·'I ... ·llivei) 
tl7 I . ~ I.~, I'I .J. 3nd 2::!q) pl.·recul n·lmi,,,, 10 thc dlici~nl uues(SI.'c apf\<'nJ" ; I 
lit,· ,,,,·r.jg~ ~llict"'l1c) so;ure for IlJ9J is -16 percellt. "h,dl Illlr lles th~1 th,' q IlCrcI'I11 
111\'1li"'~'II h".pIIJls arc U~III£ more re~Ol,lrc,,'S compar,'ll to the 9 f,;;,1 pcrl"rmjng 
11" '1'11,,1, "'l1l1il~rl~. the OI'C"rJlI a\em!!", scure for I'NS. 1997 and 1Q9~ "I !it" (6)%). 
11" I~';".I .. ,,111 0,:;8 (5Xu,) rcspl'Clilel) . Implies tMllhe 29, ]2. D",I ;1 1""I"I:d~ for 
Iqq~. IQ<J7 ~nJ 1998 ill thaI order an: usmg more rt:SOUfCt'S cllmp3r~,j I" Ih~ ~SI 
perfomung hospllals. Foc Ihe years 1994 and 19<;5. Ihe facilil i~s could hmeT lli.·IT COSIS 
h~ :'-4"0 anJ su1l achi~\e the CUflCT>II~\d5 of OUlput. compar~-d 10 45",. 811<.1 4~· . h'T 1997 
an<.l 19')8 n::;pc-ch ' d~ The rt:Sults for 11)98. do. howe .... ,., n:p~OI som~ unp""'C'l)CnIS 
on sp. ... ·llk fiK"lhllcs. lind wl1m JuJ~'t'd wi thin the conle~1 of financial dc'ClIlI.,h ... ,lIon of 
""I ~ll.Irl1ll.\ n:H'nU<" On a'tT.l~e. OO"(""\tT. the: ",suits Shol\ :I marLc"! ,k,·hne In 
I"-"1I1,lfIlIJI)c" II"" hme 
, Ir"'1I1~lIC) dlSlribullon of ,echnlcal dtklenclt'S "llh," lhe: taIIgH of 0 It'> j, l!''' m In 
I.,\'k 4 (I II sho\\s 11l:11 facI lities m 1q<>5 pcrfomled rdauld) hcllcr "'lIlf'-1,,·,II" 1997 
J,IJ I')IJ~ It:lb1c 4 6 IndiCate'S thai m 1995. 10 faeiliues had a score of I. "h,I,' 1<) OU1 of 
Ihe W "'[lI.'r,~-n.;N a d«:line In technical efficienc} It IS IIlsoclo~ar from II~ 1.,hl.'lh:l1 Ihe 
J'~II1""II"n lIf It',:hmcal dJk,coc,cs fOf Ilk: Ilt>spnals has a wider '1"";11.1 ,.1 ,·alues 
hCI"Ct111l!-I \0 1 0, IIl1iicalJn~ 10\\ l!;'Chnll:.1 efiic"'1lcl.-s III bolh pr~ anll f1O»l rdumlS. 
,. 
T .10. U .: Ih""h~'IO. of T <,<~n "'.1 rrr", .. ""Io. of ~o'rh. 11 
P . ... . ~fo .... I'u, ... d u.m 
l.1 .. 4 .19 "" 
rns '991 "" NoflQSp~- ~- • ~- • No flOIII' • 2 5 0 0 , 3 , 
0.19.0.2" , 3 2 , , " , 0.2"-0.29 2 , 3 • • " 3 O.294.l.t 2 5 3 • 3 • • , .1".0.39 , 3 0 0 2 5 2 
0.39.0 ..... 3 • 3 • 0 0 2 5 0 ..... -0 ... 9 • " 5 " 2 " 
, 
" 0..49-0.5<1 2 5 • " 2 
, 5 " 0.5"-0.59 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 
0.59-0.6" 3 • 0 0 , 3 2 0.6.--0.69 0 0 , 3 , 3 , 3 
0.69.0.1" 0 0 3 • , 3 0 
0.7"-0.19 3 • 0 0 , 3 , 0.19-O.U 2 5 , 3 , 3 0 
-0.8"·0.89 , , 2 5 2 5 0 
0.89·0.9" 0 0 0 0 0 0 , 3 
10.U.G.99 , 3 0 0 0 0 0 , , 9 23 '0 ,. 2 " • " 39 '00 39 ' 00 39 '00 39 , 
U III' I EU\Ili'A;\TS or \ ',\I{IAlI0S IS HO!,I' ITAL EFFICIE'( \ 
2, 
orl.ler 1<1 Jelennine whelher there 3re any ls\atiSlicaJly significam) change, 111 hospi tal 
elTlclenc~ o,,:r II!.: stud) pcnod This was IlchiclICd Ihrough the 3prli'~ li "n ,,)" limited 
o.,,~l1l.1c'nt \' afiable Model or Cen<;(lred T obn "'looel. 
~,:".! n~~rip.i"t Sl9lislics 
TIl<,' 1.I~_'>Cr!p1\'C statistics of the lanablc~ used in th~ cen'>Ored modd ,If,' pr"woled In 
1 . hlr ~.i: "'umm~~' of!> ' , "'"", of .h~ \ ul~bk< 
" Q'iuM~ I/eml Srd. /)no. ,\fi"rltrulri ,\f1L': i""",, ('a'e,' 
TorhOliroL dli<ic"'1 05887 O.2m """ ","" 116 A, o,.,c_ 1."g. 1l or .. ~y 58079 H&9S 
" 0000 , """ I 'b 
1\unllM't olbtd , 1 ' 6 71 99,980 " """ 3%0 1~6 
Scd O<~UpH<~ "'~I< 3879.1 44.019 00000 Hi.O '" 
1\unl,*, "I ",od, •• 1 ... " ~1J00 126.00 ~5 000 619,0 1 ~6 
l' on-m.dic,1 "aIr .","" 54,000 12 ()OO ~I )/1 '" 
The 1.1011;1 prn' Hles "anous pmllters: Firstly. the 3\'er:lge emc l cnc~ f", Ihe "ampled 
,11;;1;,,1111;; 1IIc.,3«,'d cOlcrage 01: anJ aceess 10 hCJ hh care through Illll'nl\"IIlCllIs in 
1 ""IJiU'" 111InH:, the bed occupane~ rale IS aoout J 'l'!>. \I Ilh slgni1icant di Ifcl\'lll c among 
III,' s;lIl1l'kJ racilm<:s as dlsr lalw bl 1he 51Jndard dCli3tion. The rcmallllnj,' 1~'13 hles 
IIIl~,!tC.tI ,1,10' and non-medical slIIft) 31.1<1 d iSlll:l} D marked dine.",,,'" ,,,n,,,,1:. Ihp 
1,"'litUl" 
" 
On Ihe "hole, the desmptl\'e Sl~uslies dcmonstl1llc wide differences III m~,m) In lht 
',lu;II'Iln 11.S<.<d Pel haps, IhcSt \'anallon~ could probabl) bt" :I reflection of Ilk: "II kr1!llcrs 
III ~'apacl1lc, uf lhe facililies 
",~_, I 1II1"ICl or Ii na neilll drn'n I nllisation on hos"it~J cfficlrnc), 
h,'",''''''lnll an:lI) sis "0lS done 10 e,~ami!ll: the effects of fiscal dccenll1lhSJI h'I! ,Ind other 
nrian,'loi} ,al"lablcs idcmlfied 1II1b1: lilc:rnlure on hospilal (inl eiliClcn,,) \ ""I<'W of 
ht~r.llun: sho,l\'ed Ihal beside> ~nlrnJisalion. a numtJ..-r of Instilulion:ll 1.11.'1<.,., 111",St are 
unJa ,h,· C(lnlrol oflhe health managers ofD\'l L.:$1 and e~o~11oOU5 fa~wr- Inlll"Je Lhe 
~'''11f.\1 .'1 the managers) influence hospnals "fliciellC ) Some of dctcrmill;llll" "f ,,1Un::CS 
(lJ ,III) dl'tc l .. n;.·~ Include. DECENTRALISATION REFORMS. BED ()I t I I'\",ty 
K \IF (!JUR). AVERAGE LE:\GTII OF STAY (ALOS). NUMBLR III \ 11 meAL 
S-IAI-1 l\ISTAFF). NO1\. MEDICAL STAFF INMSTAFF), BEl) Sill tHED), 
I t){ \ Ti ll'" llIRllANIRURALI. TYI'E OF O\\'NLR SIIIP IFOR-PROI II -"ol·fOR-
l'IH)III. ,mJ CJlIALITY 01 SI RVICL lB)rlll:~ and Valdmanis I~)". I , .. t>. :!t.IOO. 
"m~!.I ,/ <11191)1)) 
Ih~ h .... hnlc •• 1 cuic>ency 5(:0rl:5 (dcfI\'ndCI\I 'llfl3blc) dcnl"<'d from DLA "C·I .... ~'"maled 
U~lnt= .1 ~cn!>Orc-d Tabu model In order 10 c.~amlllt: the causes of IllcHklcIK~. a ne" 
r:nlll"UI ',lrIJIlIc "as defined \0 Iran."fonn Iltt: {lril!in31 DEA scores Inl" IIldlkleUC} 
","r,-, \~~"fdlllg 10 G~n (19931. tilt: L'!:n...:.rlnt= pmnt J" n:~lricted 1'-' /,'10' 1.11 Ih .. - left) 
,"'u!-' the 'f'<:~IIK::lUon 
" 
In ... mciency score· (I IOEA score) - I. 
Th~ eSllmablc regr.:ssion model La~c~ Lhc" fullowmg form: 
JI\EFFSCORE - no ... BI BOil. '" B: Al.OS .. 11,1 DDU MM Y ... ll.,MST All "'B. 
1-) I- , 
Nt-.1S I "Fl, "1l,J11:.OSIZE - f! 
I?I I-I 




' I ~TAFF 
"'lSI AF!' 
!l1 D">IZE 
- BN occupal1C~ mh.' (%) 
- Awml!c' Icnl!Lh of 5L3) 
,. Fiscal dcccnlrah>iltion dumln} 
,. I if decenlmlis:llion 
·OOlhcmlSC 
• Number of medical sLaff 
- Non mc1:lical slaIT 
- Bed ~ue Irro,,~ for hospi lal c(lpaci ty) 
:-'1.11,,1, •• ,1 .1I1~1~~,s W(lS po.:rfcml1cd 1l~1I!1: LlM[)EP 51alist iC(lJ SOfL\\,lr,' 1.1t-1I: -1.8 
summ~lisc~ lhi.' censored Tobu mode! results of LIl.: r"grcssion an(lJ~,l.' .""I.'~kd 10 
,kIUlI1in,· Ihe ~(lIlS(lI·c (fcCl rd3uon~h ' r bcl'H""n ll'l:hnlcal 1m) emCI.'''C~ , .. <Ill' ""J Ih,' 
" 
TobH m"dd results are $umlnansed m Table 4 8 belov. n.: coefficients fmlll 111.5 and 
MLl IIHxlds ure smular SIl~t!~lIn~ trol either of the coefficients ,-,un ". 111>0.-.1 for 
JIIJJ~si~ 1111S s!Ud~ r{'pons lhe Ordir):l0 Le:lSl Squares t'S!lm:nes. 
Tah),' 4.10( .: ronumrlrk R" soh, 
1.h:p.:IIJ~nl Vonab)c Censon.'d lechfllcal CffiC1Cm.) Scores 
Cu.,ranr 
flun~,a' 01 ",,_ dummy 
Au ",; .. k ll l:th o",,,y 
/'> UIII h' r of Mds 
Ill·,1 ""nl,,,nr~' nil. 
Medkyl Starr 
A(ljlls lnl R_Squand 
maenoslk THI 
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F-R.'io; 4.56 ••• 
Restricled (b-O) Log·L 
" Observ.tions ... 156 
0111""1 
o /)9'~1 




o II II, 
p . \.,.,,~ UHoo:a 
- 17 .8489 
OF • 149 
I'''''''r lh~ npktnat"r> PO"""" Jor the Tob,t nlOdd is tC3S0nllbl) high .111.1 'I.'II~IIC .JI~ 
.. 
prolxlblht) thai II hosptlJl IS efflell:nl IS mboul 170... This means Ih.11 tir.cul 
d~"\:r:I1Ir.tlis;,uiOf1 of am $haril1~ re\C"nue III'ould lead (0 an inc rease of 17". 111 Ihe 
ptoh.lt.i 111~ of ~ hosp.ull beinG n:11I1I\"eI~ emeient. llus linding is surprisln~ III Ih .. · li~hl of 
Ihe C"t1\cl1l1onal .. ·,$!Iom th:lt decenlrolisation of financial managcmtnl ""uIJ "nhauee 
h""pll.11 Crlicll',C) and m tum .• mprove qUillit~ of C3TC This lirxhn~ ~~ ....... J~"U1SI lhe 
Ih .. ·,lICII ... II rr.-dlcIIOIl lhal dt:cenlrdhsalion of financial manag<'flll."ni "",,,,1,[ "nhance 
hO'rll\l\ efficient) in the del i, cry of hcal!h ellre !iCf'·ICe!i. 
r he "I<:llic,cnt estimate for Ihe bed (}tcupaOC) rote IS POSI'" e and SUIIISI IC"U~ "'~llllkanl 
at th .. · I'. leI d. nllS IS conslstenl wlIh our prior expectatIOns. This impli .... Ih,'1 hij,;he r 
t";'Llr"III:~ r.lks leJd to hi~hcr emcicnc} levels. The slope coefficient of 1/\ " II<~uh'e 
,', 'nlr"f' It> (lUf a pnori expc:c19I!On. ahhou!;h 11 is Siat'S1Jeall)" inslgni ficanl 
[11<; ,·" ... II;(lCI1I eS1Jmate f(ll" moolcal sullY I~ J1c~a1tvl:' lImJ sl ahslical1~ ~ IO:1II1k1l 1l 01 the 
~ •• k, d Impl, IIlg Iha1. on avernge an increasc III Ihe lOull number 01 111cdl~;t1 1 .... ',...onllcl 
h, "II,· """IJ lead hl II rOOUCIlOll 'n hospital' s probablln) of bcllljt "(li~I"1I1 Io~ "'Q.6~._ 
I 10.' r ..... \lh~ 'IIC IIICOflSlsteni wilh II pnor; e.~peI1ahon 11m fi nding pcrh(J.p~ 1I1.t'l,"e~ lhat 
Ihc h"llih ~lJlT lire 11(){ being utilised full) This IS nol !oUrpnsin~ ~i' en Ihl:' ),." "c .. upnne)' 
k,d, 11I., .. ...t III ~1;on ... .1,3 and .... S 2. Lac~ ofdlU{!s and 10" UUliSWIUIl ill1l'r.,·~ Ihot ' he 
h" . .llh ['I:1">l.nncl nfe underulih5l:'d 11 IS ll11pcr.ui,c to ntllC that the lart;lt.k I"r "u-dlcal 
_ •• 11 I " .... 11K I,,,kd 10 search for an~ effC"Cts or medical sl..lff Oil hospi tal o:m~I,·II'" h<.'cnu~c 
Ih" 111." ~Is" mdicme an overall lnefficlenl:) of Olher mputs such II' CII"'I"""·lIt. and 
t" "I all '"I1I;\111~ nf S~f\ Ice~. "Innc: of the olher prob;lbJlIl~ ,alu.:s lITC ~1~OIIi<."ul tltIl'l~ 1Ilj1 
" 
111:11 Il",~ are OOt SlgRifiC3n1 del<,rmmanlS of the pmbabih,). or 5t:1I00 dill~r'''''II~. ,h .. ) 
10:3$1 ,,"pI~m Ih ..... ~prcl .. d \311.11: for hospllal effidenc~ 
" 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF STUDY FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
This study investigated the impact of decentralisation of financial management on 
hospital efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis and regression models. Based on 
the results. perhaps one could ask the following guiding questions: are the health I~lcilities 
providing effective and efficient quality health care, now that they are able to spend the 
retained revenue without seeking approval from Ministry of Health headquarters? Have 
the health facilities become more efficient as a result of financial decentralisation' or in 
absolute sense? How far are the facilities operating below their optimal levels? 
5.2 SUr\'e~' Results 
Lo\\' utilisation ofhospitai services is a major cause of technical inefficiency in the public 
health sector in many developing countries (Barnum and Kutzin 1(93). In this 
connection. this study investigated the extent·to which utilisation has been afTt:cted by 
liscallkcentralisation. 
Using annual attendance data from the sampled facilities, the study nssessed the 
dirference between the mean utilisation rates before and after the implementation of the 
polic}, :\ccording to the findings. (see appendix n. the effects on utilisation have been 
mixed. The results reveal no significant difference in utilisation rates betwecn thc periods 
considered (appendix). However. the mean difference for) 994 and 1998 is significant 
(H' .. tlW: 2.)407) implying a significant difference in utilisation rates in thesc t\\O years. 
Hmn:\w. \\'ith the exception of a few facilities. there appears to be no significHIll changes 
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in utilisation rates. The ,results generally imply that financial decentralisation did not 
improve utilisation of services on a large scale. From the interviews, it was revealed that 
most of the facilities have registered a decline in utilisation. 
Although utilisation does not seem to be significantly different before and after reform, 
there are a few key constraints to utilisation. First, the results generally imply that the 
cost of care may have adversely affected utilisation of services in the sampled 1~lcilities. 
For instance, from the interviews, it was revealed that the majority of patii:llts (56% of 
inpatients and 58% of outpatients) indicated that the cost of health carL' \\as fairly 
expensive or expensive. 
Secondly. low utilisation could be due to poor quality of services. As noted i:w·licr. 69% 
of the outpatients and 66.7% of the inpatients reported that they were dissatislied with the 
sen'ices provided because of the shortage of drugs and inadequate and depJomhle bed 
and linen while the majority (66,7%) of health personnel reported that the sen'ices had 
deteriorated. Thirdly, the additional revenue arising from the cost sharing programme 
appears not' to have been utilised to purchase basic inputs such as glo\'l:s. syringes 
maintaining cleanliness. x-ray and laboratory services and maintaining an effective 
system for referral purposes. Fourthly. misuse and mismanagement of thl.' revenue 
collected. low staff morale. and a decline in expenditure budget in real terms means that 
essential purchases could not be purchased. 
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Perhaps the low perceived quality of care and unreliability of services at the lower-level 
facilities could explain why majority of the patients bypass lower level facilities and refer 
themselves directly to a higher level. Based on Kenya's bottom-up referral policy. lower 
level facilities are sUPPQsed to refer patients to higher facilities. Decentral isation of 
financial management was expected to provide a basis for the inherent graduated fee 
structure along the different tiers in the health care system. In this way. services woUld be 
provided in a more cost-effective manner. Contrary to the study expectations. the survey 
findings reveal that a significant number of patients (58.9% of inpatients and 67% of 
olltpatients) bypassed the lower level facilities directly to higher facilities. 
The ahove results have adverse implications for the effectiveness of decentralisation in 
imprm'ing the referral system. Considering that primary health facilities 'Irl' l'ndowed 
with till' capacity to effectively handle Preventive and Primary Health can: (P/PIIC). the 
emerging scenario clearly shows that the proportion of revenue earmarked fl)!' P/PH'C has 
either not heen used properly or is inadequate. Further. inefficient referral systl'lll adds to 
thl' economic inefficiency in the delivery system because the higher facililil.!s hecome 
o\'\~n.:r{l\\ded with basic cases and patients incur waiting costs which could have been 
a\'oided hy ensuring that these tacilities provide a reliable and adequate quality sl.!rvices. 
These areas are among the major sources of inefficiency in the public health sector 
(Gilson J 995. Beatie el.aI1996. Zhang and Zou 1997 and Cohen el.al 1995). 
In a \\<.Iy therefore. financial decentralisation appears to exacerbate the incflccti\'cness of 
then:ferral system. This makes it difficult to improve the quality and availahility of 
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P/PHC at the lower level of the health system. Therefore, in order to streamlirte the 
referral system, the constraints preventing utilisation of services at the lower level 
facilities merit urgent attention. 
As noted t!arlier. fiscal decentralisation of cost sharing revenue was mean[ [Il address 
somt! of these quality problems. However. from the survey results, it was found that most 
of the facilities studied did not meet the revenue targets and had cost recovery ratio of 5% 
or less. This finding concurs with the data on annual revenue trends shown in section 
4.1.3. The results are consistent with other findings (Beatie et.a/ 1996: Barnum and 
Kutzin 1993: Kutzin 1995) which have reported a cost recovery of 5% of total recurrent 
health systt!llls expenditure. It is. however, important to emphasise that these studies were 
done "hen the management of user fee revenue was still centralised in most of the 
countries under which they were carried out. In the Kenyan context. if the targets are 
real istic tht!1l these results could be a reflection of poor financial managt!lllent and high 
cost or health sen'ices nott!d t!arlier. The problem could also be attributt!d [0 10\\ quality 
or sCl'\ice (proxied by drug availability. courteous staff. waiting time t!tc) whieh implies 
less dellland Il)r hospital services. thus limiting the potential self financing hase of the 
t~\l: i I it i es. 
In addition to inefficiency in revenue collection. it is evident from the survey results that 
a signiJicant number of the facilities have not been able to use the revenue gcnt!rated. 
There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly. from the staff survt!y. it ".IS rt:vealed 
that the pt!rli.1fmance of the district treasury is poor. The district treasury is mandated to 
86 
oversee the maintenance of all government accounting procedures at the district level 
including those of the Ministry of Health .. In the case of management of revenue 
generated by health facilities, it was revealed that the district treasury has been ineffective 
as evidenced by poor banking performance and 'use of revenue collected before bmlking. 
In addition. the majority of staff (75.4%) who. were interviewed considered the district 
treasury to be inefficient in processing hospital claims. It was also critised for delays in 
issuing counter-checks and in releasing funds. 
Secondly. the poor performance of the district treasury could also be attributed til lack of 
accountability among the'district accountants. The accountants are under the ollit.:e of the 
presidcnt. but in the district they are in charge of financial information and management 
of funds including those of the MOH. They are not, therefore, directly answerable to the 
MOH managers at the district level. Furthermore, hospital managers have limited 
authority over revenue expenditure and oontrol. It is not surprising then. that there is a 
delay in the procurement of drugs as reported in most facilities and an evident hm quality 
of health t.:tlre services. 
From the ub·ove. it can be inferred that efficiency of revenue collection is 110t based on 
,,'hethcr or not financial decentralisation has taken place but whether hospital managers 
hm'c the incentive to enforce the fee collection. It is important to note that the present 
financial decentralisation system provides little in~entive for hospital managers to make 
strong efforts to collect fees, lack of accountability among the district accountants and 
high burc4lucrac,y of the district treasury in managing the revenue collected. This is also a 
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reflection of the ambiguity of the definition of managerial authority and responsibilities 
of health managers. Hence, going by these results, it could be argued that many health 
facilities rarely utilise the revenue generated to ensure efficient supply or inputs or 
perhaps. the limited form of decentralisation is inadequate as a means of addressing the 
high levels of inefficiency noted earlier. In any event, lack of inputs restricts access to 
health services and coverage. as patients would seek alternatives that provide better 
health care (Braveman 1998. Beatie et.aI1996). 
The above results suggest that there is a need to address the problem or tlUnlity of 
services as measured by lack of or poor distribution of drugs and medical slipplil.!s. poor 
combination of inputs and staff imbalance. Improvement in the quality or care would 
ultimately increase utilisation levels. In addition. there is a need to consider the other 
inputs stich as beds and health personnel. In the case of beds, the health l11ill1agers and 
planners need to consider the possibility of closing some wards. Allernatin:ly. the 
hospital management could consider privatising some of the under-performing 
departments or unused beds. These policy opti()11s however need to be treah:d with 
caution hecallse improvements in the quality of care may increase utilisation levels and 
hence. the need for re·opening the wards again or supplying more beds. ()n the other 
hand. prh'atisation may exacerbate staff imbalance and ultimately low quality or service 
as the medical officers shift their services to the private section. The results in this section 
point to a need for further research or additional information on staff mix. This is critical 
beeallse as noted earlier. staff imbalance contributes to inefficiency because it inte.rferes 
with thL' proper combination of inputs. 
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As revealed in the literature review. the most important condition for the sliccess of 
fiscal decentralisation is managerial capacity. For the he.alth managers and other staff 
directly involved in the implementation of the policy reform to be able to assess the 
perfom1ance of the health facilities and/or offer technical assistance required. they need 
appropriate skills. such as capacity for financial or personnel management. In addition, 
there is definitely a need for information system to provide the relevant and acclirate data 
to the appropriate level of management when needed to improve decision-making. 
To address the problem of accessibility to health care services, there is need to strengthen 
the exemptions and waiver system in order to ensure that the vulnerable are not denied 
access to health care services. Further, for the policy of fiscal decentralisation to work, 
the responsibilities of health managers need to be accompanied by authority over revenue 
expenditure. Similar observations have been made by Reagon et.a/ (1997). Mwabu et.a/ 
(1995). Beatie el.al (1996) and Cassels (1995). 
The ellecti"eness of the policy could also be improved by establishing clear working 
relationships among various task networks. Of critical concern is the linancial 
relationship hetween district treasury and the health facilities and the means hy which 
performance is to be monitored. It is equally important to identify a mt:chanisl11 that 
would ensure accountability for the use of the revenue collected. There is also a need to 
identi r~ the critical personnel required for the effective implementation of the pol icy. 
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There is need for more authority and appropriate strategies to correct the current 
inefficiencies and improve the quality of services. This may require empowering the 
medical offi'cers of health by allowing them to recruit key personnel to manage the 
revenue collected. This requires political commitment and further training or t.he district 
teams on financial management. The findings also provide a strong case fix the need to 
have tighter financial monitoring and information systems. These would provide a 
benchmark against which financial performance and accountability could be assessed. 
Also. gi\'l~n the limitations of raising adequate revenue it would be necessary for the 
health managers to seek alternative sources of funding in order to ensure a("-:quate and 
regular supply of health care inputs. 
From the forgoing, it is evident that major inefficiencies existed before reform. Fiscal 
decentral isation reform by itself could not address all the causes of hospital inefficiency. 
In this regard. a more comprehensive approach is needed to address inefliciem:ies and 
possihly improve on quality and equity in health care delivery. 
5.3 DEA EFFICIENCY RESULTS 
It was expected that fiscal decentralisation would result in improved efficiency in the 
ddi\'er~ or quality services. However. evidence from the study findings rc\'caled that, 
contrary to expectations. decentralisation of financial management has had minimal 
impact on hospital efficiency. Technical efficiency scores computed lIsing data 
enn:lopmcnt analysis and the regression results .have shown that the perl'lmlHmce of 
health facilities have deteriorated in technical terms. For instance from Table 4.5 the 
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overall inefficiency6 for facilities in 1994 was 54 per cent, that for 1995 was:; 7 per cent 
while that for 1997 and 1998 was 45 and 42 per cent respectively. These results imply 
that the inefficient hospitals should be able to reduce the use of all inputs by 54%. 37%, 
45% and 42% respectively. Although inefficiency appear to have increased in the post 
reform period. the results show that there was already an astonishing degree of 
inefficiency'in the health care system even before the implementation of the refonn. 
Based on these findings. it is clear that. wastage of resources still persist despite the 
decentralisation of financial management of the cost sharing revenue. 
As noted earlier. the hospitals with a scale efficiency (SE) of one havl;.' the most 
productiw size for the specific input-output matrix (Kirigia et.aI1999: Banker ('l.uI1986; 
Eyob ::!OOO). The results presented in Table 4.5 show that. the average scale I..'flidency is 
77%. 71%. 76% and 73% for 1994. 1995,1997 and 1998 respectively. Thl..'se results 
imply that the hospitals are operating below their most productive size for thl..'ir ohserved 
input mix. Only a few hospitals (3. 4. 4. and 3 out of the 39 hospitals for 19~)'" to 1995 
and 1 997 to 1998) are operating at their most productive scale sizes as indicated by the 
constant returns to scale (CRS). The remaining 13., 15.23 and 20 hospitals 1(1I' the above 
mentioned period exhibit increasing returns to scale. whilst 23, 20. 12 ami 16 exhibit 
decrc41si ng returns to scale. 
,. As nOh:d earlier. a hospital with a score of I is said to be technical efficient, whilst health liKililil:s with 
kss thun I .In: technically inefficiem. Based on this information, the level of inefficiency is mca~lIred by 
the dift~rence between I and the actual efficiency score for each facility. In addition, a hosri1al which is 
censored bdow I. produces less than it would have been expected to produce on the basis of the estimated 
probabilities of the censored Tobit model. Inefficiency level was computed by deducting th..: DEA 
eflicienc~ score of each hospital from I. 
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Based on the above results. the hospitals showing DRS would operate at thc most 
productive size by scaling down its inputs and outputs. On the other hand. those facilities 
exhibiting IRS should expand their inputs and outputs. 
5.4 ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Based on the findings in section 5.2, it is important to examine the callses of (in) 
etlicicncy. The section below discusses the variables estimated in equation :2 (i.e. 
decentralisation dummy. bed occupancy rate. medical staff. non-medical stan: number of 
beds and average length of stay). 
The estimated regression coefficient pertaining to the dummy f(11' linancial 
decentralisation is positive but statistically insignificant at the 1% level. This finding 
concurs "'ith the DEA findings of the existence of inefficiency in the health care delivery 
system. These results stand in stark contrast to the results obtained by Fare () 1)1)6) and 
Gerdthmn el.al (1999). In the study by Gerdtham. the level of efficiency reported for the 
hospitals that implemented financial reforms was higher than the health f~lI.:ilitics in the 
coullciis llmt did not implement the reform. 'The success of the Swedish reforms was 
i.l1lrihuh.:d to comprehensive changes in organizational and financial structure. which 
allo\\cd indiddual councils to develop their own management control systcms. Other 
comparahk results are those by Mogedal el. at (1995) which indicate thut the locally 
raised n,'H!nUeS did not playa significant role in so far as efficiency imprmcment is 
concerned, I Il a way the results indicate that decentralisation of cost sharing alolle without 
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considering underlying causes of inefficiency, is an inadequate measllre to address 
inefficiency in the health care system. 
These results suggest that fiscal decentralisation has not improved etliciency in the 
delivery of health services. The study revealed that on average, hospitals continue to use 
more resources than they need to produce the levels of outputs they are presently 
producing. Moreover. as noted in section 4.3 most facilities continue to experience an 
irregular supply of essential inputs such as drugs which perhaps, explains why there is 
low productivity of staff. The implication here is that the health facilities could increase 
sen'ice prodsion (more outpatients and inpatients) with the same resources tlI' reduce the 
resources they currently have or even lower the inputs for the same level or outputs. In 
esscnct:. the' operations and performance of hospitals could be improved if thc revenue 
generated is better utilized to procure drugs and other essential inputs that improve the 
quality of care, Alternatively. the savings that could be generated from increased 
efficiency could then be channeled to other areas of need within the health carc system. 
The cocnicient for bed occupancy rate was found to be positive and statistically 
sigllilicallt at the 1% level indicating that it is a significant determinant ofenkicIH':Y. It is 
howe\w. interesting to note that the average bed occupancy rate (that is. the percentage 
of total heds that are oc'cupied by the patients) in the sampled facilities is lX% with 
significant ditJerence between the hospitals considered. Compared to data 'hUll other 
countries such as Lesotho (129), Malawi (116), Ethiopia (59) and Zimbab\'ve (76) (see 
Barnum and Kutzin 1993: 94). Kenya has relatively low occupancy rates al Lhe district 
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and sub-district levels7• Generally. bed occupancy levels should increase with hospital 
size. Perhaps. this is because hospitals at higher levels are assumed to be more productive 
and able to handle more referrals. case mixes and patients (Barnum and Kutzin 19(3). 
The results also show that efficiency is negatively. though insignifical1tl~ n:lated to 
average length of stay (stated differently. ALOS is positively related to inetlicil.'IH:Y). This 
result concurs with that sRown in Table 4.8 suggesting that although the average length of 
stay is not worse than the average of Lesotho (9). Ethiopia (7.2). Malawi (9) and 
Zimbahwe (6.8). it deserves attention. This finding reflects technical illetlicieJ~cy in 
hospital resource use. The most plausible explanation for this could he lIlII.' to poor 
scheduling of diagnostic and therapeutic care that result from malfunctioning machines. 
unavailahle health care inputs. lack of competent health personnel, lack or runds. staff 
and reagents cited earlier in section 4.2. These then may lead to problems ill diagnostic 
tests. equipment failures and poor hospital management. On the whole. UI1I1l'Cl'SS'II)' long 
stay is a rl'llection of economic inefficiency arid requires intervention in order to promote 
con:rage and access. 
It is impOl1ant to note that hospital bed occupancy levels and average length or stay have 
nlriou:-> policy implications. Firstly. as Bemum and Kutzin (1993) and Wagstalr (1989) 
note. 10\\ !L'wls may indicate inefficiency. even in cases where the inputs arc lIsed with 
technical etliciency. Since input costs are spread over a small number of patil.'nts. the 
Il1lerpn:tatiOli of this result should be treated with caution because the study combined dislrid and sub-
district hospitals together. This may therefore not be a true reflection of bed occupancy lewl" in Kenya. 
Newrthclcs!:> the variable is important in this study because its effects are implicilly caplllrcd in the 
computation of efficiency scores in the DEA model. 
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average cost of health services per episode increases. Secondly, unnecessarily long length 
of stay makes maintenance and management costly (notice the negative effect of ALDS 
on hospital efficiency). If hospitals were operating efficiently, then. one would expect 
high occupancy rate and low lengths of stay. 
As revealed in Table 4.8. the coefficient for medical staff is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This result shows that productivity among the medical staff is 
noticeably low and negatively associated with technical efficiency, notwithstanding the 
decentralisation of financial management. A similar finding was reported for non-medical 
statl A question would then arise as to what" reasons could be advanced to I.!xplain the 
negatiw impact of health staff on efficiency. In the first instance, their productivity could 
be low due to low bed occupancy. which means that the staff have little work to do. Our 
tield discllssion with health personnel also reveals that. most facilities lack drugs and 
other essential inputs. most of the staff are not involved in planning for the services 
needed in their sections and normally receive less thun what they have requested. Based 
011 th...: above. the study concludes that the working environment in the health facilities 
does not provide the appropriate type of incentives required in a dl.!l"l.!l1tralized 
environm...:nl. In addition: the survey finding shows that commitment and dcdication to 
work aillong the staffis lacking as a result of the above factors. Therefore. if th...: policy is 
to work dfecti\'ely. there is a need to pay attention to isslles affecting staff prOlluctivity. 
In this regard adequate supply of drugs and distribution problems. involvem..:nl or staff in 
decision making (particularly on issues affecting section operations). timely ami i.llll!quate 
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medical supplies, incentives to health personnel for better performance. effective 
supervision and remuneration of personnel merit urgent attention. 
Using beds as a proxy for installed capacity, the regression results indicate that lI.:chnical 
efficiency is'negative, but insignificantly influenced by the number of beds, Although the 
negative correlation is statistically insignificant, it suggests the existence of excess 
capacity in the public health facilities. This implies that beds in inefficient hospitals in the 
study sample are too many for the output being produced. Stated differently. it means that 
the cases of outpatients and inpatients recorded by the 39 facilities studied could be 
produced by fewer facilities. if resources were utilized more efficiently. 
96 
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary of key findings 
This study focused on the impact of decentralized financial management system under 
the cost-sharing scheme on efficiency. quality and access to health care. It has been 
argued in policy documents that the reform would enhance efficiency of health facilities 
in service provision. The study involved assessment of patient and staff survey - quality 
of care. access and hospital efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis. Usil1g hospital 
inputs and outputs and the DEA approach. it was possible to generate efficiellCY scores 
for each of the 39 sampled facilities for the specified period. 
The findings revealed that utilisation of health care services, quality of ser\'ices. access 
and revenue collection have not improved. The study indicated that utilisation rates have 
remained low suggesting that fiscal decentralisation has not been effective in enhancing 
access to health care services. This failure is partly attributable to the struclure of the 
financial management system. which does not provide incentives to the heallh managers. 
Olhl!r faclors include laCK of authority and autonomy of health facilities ovcr Ihl.: revenue 
genenltt:d. an inefficient district treasury and unavailability of certain health care inputs 
slich as drugs. In such circumstances health care managers cannot be expccIl.:d 10 effect 
the policy reform if they are expected to work with a limited and uncertain /low of 
rcsourcl.:s and authority. 
In terms of efficiency of revenue collection. it is interesting to note that an O\'l.:l'\\'hclming 
majority of the sampled facilities (93%) collected less than what they could pOIl.:l1tial/y 
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collect and only (7%) of these were able to meet the set targets. Moreover. it was reported 
that the revenue banked was actually less than what was collected. Ideally the health 
facilities are'supposed to bank 95% of the revenue collected and retain 5% flu' cmt:rgency 
cases, According to the survey findings the difference arise due to spending before 
banking. theft or fraud. While assigning expenditure responsibilities to health ma~agers 
would enhance accountability and transparency in the use of the revenue generated. there 
is need for sound financial system to support and ensure up-to-date information on 
financial resources and use. 
\\';th regard to budget allocation to health facilities by government. the majority of the 
stafr ind kated that recurrent expenditure Oli health has declined in real h:nns. This 
tinding l:onl:urs with the findings by Kireria and others in 1999. This has contributed to 
lal:k or hcalth facility inputs (drugs and supplies etc). As a result the quality or l.:are has 
continut:d to decline below acceptable levels. while the health care 1~Il:ilities are 
undermilised as noted earlier. This situation is critical in view of the inadclJuate and 
inenil:icnt collection of revenue. The key policy issue here is that the M( )11 should 
continue to make adequate budgetary provisions to support operations or the health 
1~lcililics. Thcre is also a need for better co-ordination between the decentraliscd financial 
mLlnagcmclll systems. NOOs and donors as well as considering a more comprchensive 
ht'alth SCl:tor retorm e.g. decentralisation of health personnel recruitment. This is 
ncccssar~ in order to ensure accountability of health personnel. 
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With regard to efficiency, the study results point out that efficiency in health care 
facilities was lower in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period. The 
average efficiency level for 1994 was 46% that for 1995 was 63% and 5511.) for 1997 
whi Ie that for 1998 was 58%. As noted earlier,' an efficient hospital should have a score 
of 100%. These results show that inefficiency is wide spread in most of the I~H;ilities 
studied. The inefficiency can probably be attributed to general mismanagement, 
pal1icularly that relating to financial management, lack of drugs and medical supplies, 
low staff productivity and commitment to duty. Given the high level of ind'liciency in 
the health care delivery system prior to the introduction of the reform. decentralisation of 
financial management alone. without paying attention to the wide range of other 
efficiency constraints identified. may not achieve the stated goals of this reflll"lll. 
A larger number of hospitals were found to exhibit some degree of scale inefliciency with 
the majority' showing DRS and IRS. The mean scale efficiency was 77 per cenl. 71 per 
cent. 7() per cent and 73 per cent for 1994. 1995, 1997 and 1998 respectively. These 
results shows that most of the facilities are not operating at their most optimal scale size 
both in the pre and post reform period. The led to the conclusion that decentral ization of 
financial management has led to very minimal improvement in hospital perllmnance. 
This is not surprising given that most of the hospitals were experiencing high levels of 
inefficiency even before the decentralization. Moreover. the partial fiscal decenll'alization 
and other facility specific constraints identified earlier on. make realization or better 
perllmll<lnce almost impossible. 
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These findillgs have some implications to the health sector in Kenya as it moves to 
decentralise the entire sector through the release of block grants. The decentralisation of 
financial responsibilities of cost sharing revenue to the district health faci litit:s. without 
addressing the other efficiency constraints identified. has not yielded the relluirt:d results. 
From a policy perspective. the important lesson to learn from these results is that. the 
resource base of the facilities could be enhanced or saved by addrt:ssing more 
comprehensively factors that impact on efficiency. Fiscal decentralisation should not 
therefore be viewed as the ultimate solution to ensuring efficient servil:t: dt:livery. It 
needs to be ~upported by other strategies. 
Another key policy issue that merit attention is the question on how to impf(H'e dliciency 
of the \'arious task networks and in particular the financial relationship betwt:l:n district 
tn:asury and health care managers. and the means by which performant:t: is to be 
monilOn:d. This issue becomes even more crucial in view of the continued ilh:flicicncy in 
the health service delivery system. The implication is that significant gains hOI11 financial 
deccntralisation could be realised by granting more expenditure responsihilities and 
autonomy on budget making to health care managers. This should however he J"ollowed 
by a "hard budget constraint"" to ensure that health facilities provide servict:s efficiently 
and \\ ithin their means as well as making the managers accountable for their at:tillns. 
Another area of the task network that needs attention is that of medical suppl ics. Perhaps, 
additional tinancing from the MOH and or honouring its budget allocations or better 
management of the cost sharing revenue could ensure better delivery of sen' ict:s, There is 
100 
also a need for better stock management to control pilferage at the facility level, and 
closer co-ordination of MOH and donor supplies in order to improve efficiency in the 
supply of drugs and other medical supplies. In addition, health managers need to be given 
more authority and autonomy to use the revenue in order to sustain drug supplies. To 
ensure dfectiye co-ordination of the various activities suggested. it is important to 
impron! the management of facilities. 
Promoting effective utilisation of health care inputs IS a pre-requisite for reducing 
inefficiency in the procurement of drugs. delays in distribution within the lilcilities and 
supply of the required quantities by the central medical supplies department and the 
medical stores within the health facilities. In this regard. estimates for the ref.luirements 
should he done by individual hospitals with inputs from all the heads of depurtments. In 
addition. the health facility managers should be given flexibility in purchasing drugs from 
the rvkdica) Supplies Co-ordinating Unit (MSCU), perhaps by using the funds allocated 
fi'om the treasury. However. given the limited recurrent expenditure allocation hy the 
gowrnmcnt. it may be prudent to improve efficiency in the collection of cost sharing 
n:n:l1uc. 
In addition to the above suggestions. the following issues merit attention: 'Ih:rc is a need 
10 lonk carefully at staff mix and levels and/~r improve human resource management. 
Therc is also a critical need to review bed numbers and carefully consider options for 
reducing them given the low bed occupancy rate. 
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Finally. in addition to addressing the constraints identified above, there is a need to look 
at the issue of monitoring efficiency at the facility level. It was highlighted ill the study 
that the facilities could make savings if the available resources are utilised efficiently. So 
far. apart from policy statement concerning efficiency. there are no indicators that the 
health managers are in a position to assess the operations of their institutions. Thus. from 
a policy perspective. there is a need to establish specific guidelines for addressing 
inefficiency' in the health care sector. Tbi's will require designing of 111011 itoring 
instruments for health managers that will enable them to identify not only sources of 
inefficiency within their health facilities but also those which present the greatest 
opportunity for real improvements in health care delivery. 
6.2 SPEC) FlC RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Given the limitations of this study. there is definitely a need to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of efficiency as well as resource base of the health care 
SystL'I11. However. to' achieve the objective of enhancing efficiency and quality of 
can:. it is important to collect data on a regular basis. Therefore. in order to ensure 
soulld decision-making. the study recommends that a systematic data collection 
ewn.:isc be established. The starting point ~ould be to develop National Health 
Al:l:ounts to collect expenditure. fee revenue, other input and output dat'l 011 health 
institutions in the country for use in efficiency analysis. This is necessary hel:allSe the 
strel1gth:~nd reliability of DEA methodology depends on the availability or adequate 
and lJuality data. 
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• Based on this conclusion, the study recommends that some bench marks be t:.xplored 
using indicators drawn from health facility inputs and outputs. These will form the 
basis for monitoring efficiency in the delivery of health care services under the 
reform programme. In addition, there is a need to examine hospital specific 
determinants of efficiency and the relationship between the health facility and other 
institutions that have a direct effect on their performance. 
• Training is an important element of the reform process. There is thereforc. a need for 
suitably trained health professionals or managers to take on managerial roks. which 
combine technical. financial and administrative responsibilities. Such skills are 
necessary in order to monitor spending and performance as well as other facility 
resources. As noted above. this requires among others, tools or instrumcnts for 
assessing efficiency in service delivery. 
III lighl of the above recommendation, the feasibility of starting an efticit:IH:Y analysis 
unit. probably to be located at the provincial level. The function of lh\.' IIllit would 
inyolye information gathering on inputs and outputs from district health Itlcilities. and 
asscss using identified indicators. the efficient utilisation of these inputs ill service 
ddiyery. equity, access and on exemptions. Such a unit would requires den:lopment 
or c,lpacity at the provincial level. Alternatively, the health managers IlCI:U to be 
trained on efficiency measurement approaches so as to be in a position [0 monitor 
efliciency within their health facilities. 
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• Motivation and incentives to health personnel is important and need to be considered 
in the current policy reform. Perhaps. the health facility managers could consider 
avenues through which the additional revenue generated within the fi:H.:ililies could 
benefit the staff. By addressing the weaknesses of the refonn policy identilied in the 
study as 'well as effective utilisation of the revenue in enhancing quality or services 
pro\'ided. it is likely that more patients would be attracted, It is also possihk 1 hat with 
improved planning and organisation, the additional revenue generated ami savings 
from improved efficiency could be reallocated to supplement health inputs and 
improve the quality of services especially at lower levels to improve referral systems. 
6.3 Sll(;GESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study reviewed the effect of fiscal decentralisation under the cost sharing refonn 
programme t.)Il hospital efficiency. As such. detailed analysis of inputs alld OUlputs of 
health 1~I\.:ilities required for measuring efficiency and equity issues was beyond the scope 
or this study. Therefore. in view of the current emphasis on efficiency in health care 
seClOr rclt.wms. there is need for further research on the measurement or d'Jiciency. 
resourcc base of health facilities and on the issues pertaining to improvcments of 
enkiency, Here Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may well prove a lISC I'll I 1001. The 
DLA model for example would enable health managers or planners. not onl) hI identify 
tools I'm efficiency monitoring and eval uation. but also identify ineflkicnl health 
Ilu.:i I ilies and inputs that c'an be reduced and by' how much. This will provide an important 
planning tool especially now when the focus of health sector reform is on improving 
efliciency. equity and quality of care. These issues are therefore worth exploring. 
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Table 4.1c The ditlrenm~!:bt!tw~een 
1m 
Year Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Cont: Interval] 
1995 39 6381.077 866.4696 5411.101 4627.001 
1997 39' 6789.513 1162.874 7262.145 4435398 
difTl 39 -408.4359 547.7752 3420.855 ~]5]7349 700.4771 
Ho: mea n(1995 - 1997) == mean (diff)- 0 
'\ 
Ha: mean (dirt) < 0 
t = -0.7456* 
P < t = 0.2302 
• No difference in 
Ha: mean (diff) -- 0 
t·:: -0.7456* 
P> It I ~ 0.4605 
HI: mean (diff) > 0 . 
t';" .:o.74~6· 
P>t ... 0.7698 
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To the inten'iewee, 
This interview schedule is designed to collect data for the purpose of assessing 
decentralisation of the cost recovery revenue reform and its impact on hospital efficiency 
and health care delivery in Kenya. Your views on the quality of service are important in 
helping us assess whether the decentralisation reform is meeting its intended objectives or 
not. Please feel free to give information on the questions asked. All the information you 
give will be treated with strict confidence. 
7l1lll1k you/Of" YOlfr cooperation 
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A. Information about patient 
1. Gender of respondent 
I Male 
2. How old will you be at your next birthday? 
-------------- Years 
3. Referral status: were you referred to this hospital? 
Referred 1 
No referral 2 
Bypass 3 
Not applicable 4 
4. Ifreferred, indicate level of referring facility 
Dispensary I 
Health center 2 
Private clinic " -' 
Others (specify)-- 4 
----------------------
----------------------
B. Patients Perceptions of quality of service 
5 How do you rate the quality of service in this hospital? 
(Please tick the relevant box) 
Excellent Good Fair 
Availability of qualified 
personnel 




Reliable supply of drugs 
Overall quality of service 
117 
Poor Don't know 




Too long 4 
7. How much time did the doctor/nurse spend with you in examining and treating 
you?' 
5 minutes or less 1 
15 minutes or less 2 
About Y2 hour 3 
More than 30 minutes 4 
8. In your opinion, did the nurse or the doctor' spend adequate time with you? 
Yes 
No 2 
9. Were you comfortable with the language, which the doctor/nurse used? 
10. Would you have preferred another language? 
II To what degree did you feel understood by the nurse/doctor? 
Very well I 
Well 2 
Only partly 3 
Not at all 4 
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12. After this visit, to· what degree do you feel your symptoms have been addressed? 
Very well 1 
Well 2 
Only partly 3 
Not at all 4 
13. To what degree do you feel your concerns have been resolved? 
Very well I 
Well 2 
Only partly 3 
Not at all 4 
14. Are you.satisfied wit~ the care provided in.this hospital? 
I~ 
If NO, GO to Question 15 ELSE, GO to question number 16 
15. What are the reasons for dissatisfaction? 
Shortage of drugs and other critical supplies I 
Medical staff not courteous 2 
Unavailability of staff 3 
No specialised treatment 4 
I Waiting time too long 5 
Long outpatient queues/jumping queues 6 
I Others (specify)----------------------------------- 7 
------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------
16. In your opinion, do you feel that the fee revenue collected is adequately utilised? 
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17. What in your opinion are the three most important things that hospital administrators 
could do to improve health care delivery? Indicate which is the most important 




18. Do you find in general, the cost of health care is 
Very expensive 1 
Fairly expensive 2 
Slightly expensive 3 
Not at all 4 
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I 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INPATIENT INERVIEWS 
This interview should be conducted with p~tients at each hospital. Patients can be 
randomly selected as they are leaving the facility. 
[)ate: ------------------
Enumerators Name: -----------------------------------
To the interviewee, 
This interview schedule is designed to collect data for the purpose of assessing 
decentralisation reform and its impact on efficiency and health care delivery in Kenyan 
hospitals. Your views on the quality of service are of paramount importance in assessing 
whether the reform is meeting its intended objectives or not. Please feel free to give 
information on the questions asked. All the information you give will be treated with 
strict confidence. 
(hollk ,rou/or YOllr cooperalioll 
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A. Information about patient 
1. Gender of respondent 
I Male 
I Female 2 
2. How old will you be at your next birthday? 
-------------- years 
3. Referral status: were you referred to this hospital? 
Referred 1 
No referral 2 
Bypass 3 
Not applicable 4 
4. If referred, indicate level of referring facility 
Dispensary 1 
Health center 2 




5. If the answer to question 4 is "no referral/bypass" what are the reasons for bypassing 
the appropriate health facility? 
Long waiting time 1 
Lack of drugs 2 
Lack of diagnostic tests 3 
Incompetent health workers 4 
i Others (specify) 5 
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6. How do you rate the quality of service in this hospital? 
. (Please tick the relevant box) 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Don't know 
Availability of qualified 
personnel 




Reliable supply of drugs 
Overall quality of service 




Too long 4 
8. How much time did the doctor/nurse spend with you in examining and treating 
you'" 
5 minutes or less I 
15 minutes or less 2 
About Y:! hour 3 
More than 30 minutes 4 
9. In your opinion, did the nurse or the doctor spend adequate time with you':' 
I ~~s 2 
10 Were you comfortable with the language, which the doctor/nurse used':' 
I~ 
12) 
11. Would you have preferred another language? 
I~ 
12. To what degree did you feel understood by the nurse/doctor? 
Very well 1 
Well 12 
Only partly 3 
Not at all 4 




14, To what degree do you feel your concerns have been resolved? 
I Very well 1 
• Well 2 
• Only partlv 
.., 
-' 
i Not at all 4 
I:; Are you satisfied with the care provided in this hospital? 
I~ 
If NO. GO to Question 16 ELSE. GO to question number 17 
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16. What are the reasons for dissatisfaction? 
Shortage of drugs and other critical supplies 1 
Medical staff not courteous 2 
Unavailability of staff 3 
No specialised treatment 4 
• Waiting time too long 5 
Long outpatient queues/jumping_queues 6 
I at hers (speci fy)----------------------------------------- 7 
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~:~~~~:~:~~~~:~~~~:::---------------------
17. In your opinion, do you feel that the fee revenue collected is adequately utilised? 
18. What in your opinion are the three most important things that hospital administrators 
could dq to improve health care deliveryr Indicate which is the most important 
(mark with I) . 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Do you find in general, the cost of health care is 
Very expensive I 
Fairly expensive 2 
Slightly expensive 3 
Not at all 4 
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Fiscal decentralisation and its impact on efficiency and delivery of health· care 
service in Kenyan Hospitals. 
Questionnaire for Hospital staff: (key informants: medical officers of health, medical 
superintendents, matrons, pharmacists and hospital' clerks/accountants) 
Dear respondent, 
This questionnaire is designed to collect data for the purpose of assessing the impact 
decentralisation of cost recovery revenue on hospital efficiency and health care delivery 
in Kenya. Your views will be very helpful in determining whether the reform is meeting 
its intended objectives or not. Please feel free to provide information on the questions 
asked. All information you gil'e will be treated in strict confidence. 
Thank YOII fiJ,. you,. cooperal io11. 
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A. Staff Background: 
1. Occupational title---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Highest (formal) education level attained ------------------------------------------------
3. How long have you been in the public service? 
Less than a year 1 
Between 1-4 years 2 
Between 5-9 years 3 
i Over 9 years 4 
B: Revenue collection and use. 
4. Are you aware of decentralisation of financial management reforms that IS 10 
force" 
I~ 
5. What would you say is the objective of fiscal decentralisation reforms? 
6 Do you have fee revenue collection targets? 
Yes I 
No 2 
7. IF YES, have you been able to meet the target? 
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8. IF your answer to question 4 is NO, give reasons? 
(Please tick one or more of the appropriate boxes) 
Poor financial management 
High staff absenteeism 
Low supervisory visits and meetings by DHMSs 
Embezzlement of funds/pilferage 
Inappropriate recording and reporting systems 
I Unauthorized exemptions 
I Others (please specify)--------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------.. _----------
------.-----.-._-------------------.-._-.--------------------------
9. When should fee revenue be banked? . 
(Please tick only one of the following boxes) 
Same day 1 
Following day 2 
Once in a week 3 








10. In your opinion do collections correspond/equal the amount banked? 
II. If t Q f 7' NO . answer 0 ues IOn IS , give reasons or ELSE GO TO question 9. 
I Theft of funds . 1 
Spending before banking 2 
Fraudulent spending 3 
Spending without authority 4 
Other (Please specify 5 
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12. Does the policy permit cash revenue to be spent before banking? 
I Yes 1 
• No 2 
If answer to 9 above is YES, explain under what circumstances----------------------
Expenditure 
13. In your opinion, who should be involved in the planning and management of 
revenue generated by cost sharing? 





• Others (specify )---:.------------------------- .5 
15 In your opinion are there cases of conflict in roles in relation to AlE's between the 
different structures (MOR DHMTIDHMBs)? 
I~ 
16. Are you aware of how the revenue collected at the facility should be spenf) 
, Yes 
I ~ I 
17. If you answer to question 14 is YES, how should the revenue retained spent? 
(PI . k f h boxes) ease hc one or more 0 t e appropriate 
t Purchase of drugs I 
: Buying equipment 2 
I Building maintenance 3 
! Additional staff 4 
i BlI\'ing hospital linen 5 
: Mailltt.:nance of vehicles 6 
Gi\ing subsid\' to poor 7 
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I Transport 8 
Staff incentives 9 
I Medical stationary 10 
Other (specify)--------------------------- 1l 
I ----------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------
18. In your .opinion, has the district treasury. performed its function of overseeing the 
adherence oflaid down accounting procedures? 
I ~~s I ~ ! 
19. If you . 16° N r answer In IS O,InW IC ? ways. 
Delays in getting AlE's 1 ! 
Delays in releasing funds 2 
• Diversion offunds 3 
Delays in issuing counter-checks 4 
Lack of accountability among district accountants 5 
Ot hers (specify )------------------------------------------ 6 
----------------------------------------.---------_._--------
20, 1 n your opinion, has the Ministry of Finance used the existence of cash revenues 
retained by hospital to reduce the budget allocation? 
I~ 
21, In your opinion, what problems are related with the implementation offinancial 
Decentralisation reform? 
Lack of skilled st.lff I 
Lack of cquipment!\'chiclcs for supervision 2 
Lack of clcar polic\' to implemcnt thc policy 3 
Lack of orientation <md tmining of hospital staff .t. 
Lack of moniloring and supervision b\' MOH. DHMBslDHMTs 5 
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24. In your opinion, what factors are responsible for problems relating to drug supply and 
use? 
Poor stock management 1 
Procurement problems 2 
Delays in distribution 3 
Inadequate funding 4 
Un anticipated demand 5 
Pilfera2e 6 
Inadequate transport to distribute drugs 7 
OUJers (specify)-------------------------------------------------- 8 
: ------_ .... _------_ .... ---._------------------------------..... _---_ .... _--
TransllOl't services 
25. In you opinion, are the hospital vehicles in good running condition? 
I~ 
26. If answer to 22 is NO, why are they grounded?, 
• Poor sClyiceimaintenance 1 
.~d~~~ 2 
! Old 3 
: Olher (specify)----------------------------------------------- 4 
27. In your opinion what problems have the hospital experienced from nOll-operational 
vehicles? 
Hiu:h operating costs and maintenance 1 
Inadequate transport 2 
Inabi lity to carry out supervision of primary/preventive care activities 3 
Inability to deliver inputs-drugs &medical supplies .J 
• Transfer of referred J)<Jticnts is made impossible 5 
Inability ofDHMBs to conduct supervision of hospitals 6 
Other (specify )----------------------------:--------------------------------------- 7 
--------.. ----------------------------.-------------------------------------------------
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28. In your opinion, do you think that the quality of services has improved as a result 
offiscal decentralisation reform? 
I~ 
29. In what ways has the quality changed? 
(Please tick one or more of the appropriate boxes) 
Greatly improve Not Deterio 
improved d improved rated 
Availability of dru~s 
Attitude of staff to patients 
Cleanliness of rooms, toilets etc 
Availability of x-ray services 
Availability of lab. Services 
Appearance of buildings e.g. (well painted, 
improved maintenance) 
Availability of adequate bed 
linen/blan kets 
Availability and quality of food 
Competence of staff 
Improved stafT morale 
Overall quality of service at this facility 
-( 
30 \\'hat is the most important thing you would like improved in this hospital') 
3 I. Are there any other specific issues that you feel should be taken into consideration 
in enhancing the success of fiscal decentralisation reform? ----------------------------
T/"",k.for your cooperlltion in completing tire questionnaire. 
132 
Don't 
know 
